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对此的分析已经很多，已经是一个基本性的结论。See John P. Brown, Toward an Economic Theory of Liability, Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 2, 1973, Pp323—350; See also Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics, Third Edition, Addison Wesley Longman, Inc., 2000, P287+; See also William Landes and Richard A. Posner, The Economic Structure of Tort Law, Harvard University Press, 1987; See also Keith N. Hylton, Costly Litigation and Legal Error Under Negligence, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol. 6, 1990, P433—452.
See Robert Cooter, Economic Theories of Legal Liability, The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 5, Issue 3, 1991, Pp11—30.更为准确的表述应当是依据边际原则来对这一公式加以调整，See Robert Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution, California Law Review, Vol.73, January 1985, No.1, P1-51.
See Eric A. Posner, Contract Remedies: Forseeability, Precaution, Causation and Mitigation, in Bouckaert, Boudewijn and De Geest, Gerrit (eds.), Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, Volume III. The Regulation of Contracts, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2000, P163+. 小波斯纳是从当事人的预见能力不足和难以判断上来进行批评的。爱泼斯坦教授则是从因果关系上进行批评的。See also Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 2, 1973, Pp151—204.
See Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, Fairness versus Welfare, Harvard University Press, 2002, P86.
在本文的分析中，采用了一些数学分析，这是为了叙述更为简洁和清晰，本文将其局限于非常初级的微积分水平，任何受过大学数学教育的读者（这在今天的法学院中已经普及了）都应该可以理解。当然，这种简化也是受限于作者的能力的。有关的数学模型，部分参照了 Thomas J. Miceli, Economics of the Law: Torts, Contracts, Property, Litigation, Oxford University Press, 1997, Pp16—20.
强单调性和严格拟凹性，是对个人效用函数的一个假定。前者意味着偏好的传递性，后者意味着生产集的凸性。这两个假设意味着可以采用平滑的曲线和进行边际上的比较和分析。这些是对人类行为进行分析的基础，如果放松这些假定，经济分析会变得非常困难和几乎不可能。关于这一假设，参见 哈尔·瓦里安：《微观经济学：高级教程》，第三版，周洪等译，经济科学出版社1997年版，第6—10页。对此假设，有许多法律经济学文献进行批评，See Schwartz, Contributory and Comparative Negligence: A Reappraisal, Yale Law Journal, Vol. 87, 1978, P697+。甚至有学者批评这种线性或连续性的假设，在哲学上导致亚里士多德的校正正义的观念就是错误的。See Richard A. Epstein, Torts, Aspen Law & Business, 1999, P109.
考虑到现实中的预防水平和预防成本的关系，我们认为这种替代是完全合乎逻辑的。
几乎每一本教科书或者类似的文献都有相关的证明，兹不一一列举。See Thomas J. Miceli, The Economic Approach to Law, Stanford University Press, 2004, P47.
包括加害人的过错责任negligence rule，以及受害人过错的加害人过错责任，negligence with contributory negligence。
See Thomas J. Miceli, The Economic Approach to Law, ibid, P46—54; See also Jeniffer Arlen, Re-examing Liability Rules when Injuries as well as Victim Suffer Losses, International Law and Economics, Vol. 10, 1990, Pp233—239. 同时可以参见 Peter Diamond, Single Activity Accidents, Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 3, 1974, Pp107—164. Diamond分析指出，纯粹的过错责任是缺乏效率的。
See Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 2, 1973, Pp151—204. See also Richard A. Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and its Utilitarian Contaits, Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 8, 1979, P49.爱泼斯坦教授对功利主义的批评，表明他仍然属于康德主义传统，从而有别于法律经济学的边沁传统。
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