对
公司法的法律调整方式，采用的case by case的方法，也有许多学者提出批评，See Marcel Kahan and Ehud Kamar, Price Discrimination in the Market for Corporate Law, Cornell Law Review, Vol. 86, 2001, P1205—1239; See also Ehud Kamar, Shareholder Litigation Under Indeterminate Corporate Law, University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 66, 1999, Pp887—891.事实上，这是在存在重大理论争议的时候，以及法院的能力受到限制，必然采取的方式。
公司法的大多数有争议性的规则和案例，都和本文所讨论的理论分析相关。对case by case的审判方式，Cooter指出，在长期进化中，如果法院遵守“先例必须遵守”，则可以产生有效率的规则。See Robert Cooter, Lewis Kornhauser and David Lane, Liability Rules, Limited Information, and the Role of Precedent, The Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 10, Issue 1, 1979, Pp366—373.
See Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, Economica, Vol. 4, 1937, P387—388.
See Mark J. Roe, The Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm and Industrial Organization, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 149, 2001, P2063+.
See Margaret Blair and Lynn A. Stout, Director Accountability and the Mediating Role of the Corporate Board, Washington University Law Quarterly, 2001, summer, P403+. See also H Lowell Brown, The Corporate Director’s Compliance Oversight Responsibility in the Past Caremark Era, Delaware Journal of Corporate Law, Vol. 26, 2001, Pp4—145.See also Eric W. Orts, Corporate Governance Stakeholder Accountability, and Sustainable Peace: War and the Business Corporation, Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 35, 2002, P549+.
See Gail A. Lasprogata and Marya N. Cotton, Contemplating “Enterprise”: The Business and Legal Challenges of Social Entrepreneurship, American Business Law Journal, Vol. 41, 2003, P67+.
在公司的税收理论中，双重征税和实体论必然是联系在一起的，See Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice and Public Interest: A Study of the Legislative Process as Illustrated by Tax Legislation in the 1980s, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 139, issue 1, 1990, P60+; See also Barry Adler, Financial and Political Theories of American Corporate Bankruptcy, Stanford Law Review, Vol. 45, 1993, P311+ .
See Jennifer Arlen and Deborah M. Weiss, A Political Theory of Corporate Taxation, Yale Law Journal, Vol. 105, Issue 2, 1995, P325+.
See Lynn A. Stout, The Shareholder as Ulysses: Some Empirical Evidence on Why Investors in Public Corporations Tolerate Board Governance, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 152, issue 2, 2003, P667+; See also Bernard Black and Reinier Kraakman, Delaware’s Takeover Law: The Uncertain Search for Hidden Value, New York University Law Review, Vol. 96, 2002, P521+，在该文中，两位学者指出，公司的隐藏价值是存在的，属于努力工作的董事会可见的，而对股东和潜在的进入者而言，是不能看到的。由于80年代的并购和反并购的大争论，导致公司的性质成了理论焦点，并且这场争论越来越持续，进一步延伸到公司的各个制度规则之中。这也是本文的主要的写作动机。这种争论的主要表现，文献众多，可以参见 Ronald J.Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offer, Stanford Law Review, Vol. 33, 1981, P819+; See also Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel H. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 94, 1981, P1161+; See also Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competiting Tender Offer, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 95, 1982, P1028+. See also John C. Coffee, Jr., The Bylaw Battlefield: Can Institutions Change the Outcome of Corporate Control Contests? University of Miami Law Review, Vol. 51, 1997, P605+; See also Jeffery N. Gordon, “Just Say Never?” Poison Pills, Deadhand Pills and Shareholder Adopted Bylaws: An Essay for Warren Buffet, Cardozo Law Review, Vol. 19, 1997, P511+.
参见 连建辉：《融资结构与企业控制权争夺》，《财经研究》，2002年第1期。同时参见 张秋生、李霞、吴丽青：《控制权市场浮出水面》，《中国证券报》2002年11月7日。
See Jean Tirole, Corporate Governance, Econometrica, Vol. 69, No. 1, 2001, Pp1—35; 作者指出，“在法和经济学学者中，公司治理的标准定义就是如何保护股东的利益”； see also Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 52, Issue 2, 1997, Pp737—783; 在该文中作者认为公司治理就是确保融资提供方获得其回报的途径；而到了Zingales, 他则认为公司是一个影响到准租金的事后谈判的复杂的约束集。See Luigi Zingales, Corporate Governance, in Peter Newman, ed., The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, Macmillan Reference Limited, 1998, Pp497—503.
