Stockholder模式的说法，借用了汉斯曼教授的说法，他将整个世界范围内，
公司法的基本模式，分为stockholder-oriented; stakeholder-oriented; state-owned-oriented; labor-oriented和manager-oriented的五种，将stockholder-oriented视为正统模式，其他的都是变异模式，并且认为其他模式正在衰落之中，已经被证明是缺乏效率的。这被称之
公司法的进化终结。See Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, Georgetown Law Journal, Jan 2001, Vol. 89, Issue 2; P. 439—469.
中国经济学界中对此进行介绍的，见 崔之元：《美国29州
公司法变革的理论背景及对我国的启示》，《经济研究》1996年第4期；以及 沈艺峰：《公司控制权市场理论的现代演变－美国三十五个州反收购立法的理论意义》，《中国经济问题》，2000年第2期；更为系统和正式的文献，参见 杨瑞龙、周业安：《企业的利益相关者理论及其应用》，北京：经济科学出版社2000年版。应当说，利益相关者理论和公司治理成为主导性研究主题和社会热点问题，两者是紧密相关的。
对法人财产权的讨论，是中国90年代后期公司理论的核心命题，对此的综述，参见 史际春、温晔、邓峰：《企业
公司法》，中国人民大学出版社2001年版。
Adolf A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property, Revised Edition, New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1968, Preface VII—VIII.
比较著名的批评，参见 Walter Werner, Management, Stock Market and Corporate Reform: Berle and Means Reconsidered, Columbia Law Review, Vol. 77, 1977, P388+.
对此的批评，包括许多著名的经济学家，如德姆塞茨、斯蒂格勒等等，See Harold Demsetz, The Structure of Ownership and the Theory of the Firm, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 26, 1983, P375+; See also George J. Stigler and Claire Friedland, The Literature of Economics: The Case of Berle and Means, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 26, 1983, P237+; See also Herny Manne, The “Higher” Criticism of the Modern Corporation, Columbia Law Review, Vol. 62, 1962, Pp399—407.
公司是一个合同的连接体，这种视野基本上构成了早期法律经济学学者的基本判断和假设，最典型的表述是詹森和麦克林，See Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, The Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, Journal of Financial Economics, 1976, P305+。哈特和格罗斯曼则是将合同反转，即合同由于信息问题不可能穷尽所有发生的若然情况，因而有必要采用赋予一方以所有权，从而解决合同中不能穷尽的问题；这基本上也是沿着这一思路展开的，不过是把合同换成了更为从法律上界定的“产权”；这种产权的概念和法律上的存在着极大差异。See Sanford J. Grossman and Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, Journal of Political Economics, 1986, Vol. 94, P691+. See also Oliver Hart, An Economist’s Perspective on the Theory of the Firm, Columbia Law Review, Vol. 89, 1989, P1757+.
See Armen A. Alchain and Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, American Economic Review, Vol. 62, 1972, P777.
代表性的作品非常多，几乎是目前的法律经济学公司理论的全部，See Joseph T. Walsh, The Fiduciary Foundation of Corporate Law, Journal of Corporation Law, spring 2002, Vol.27, Pp333—337; See also Larry E. Ribstein and Henry N. Butler, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A Reply to the Anti-Contractarians, Washington Law Review, Vol. 65, 1990, P1+; See also Henry M. Butler, The Contractual Theory of the Corporation, Georgia Mason Law Review, Vol. 11, 1989, P99+; See also Jonathan R. Macey, Corporate Law and Corporate Governance: A Contractual Perspective, Journal of Corporation Law, Vol. 18, P185; See also Larry E. Ribstein, Choosing Law by Contract, Journal of Corporation Law, Vol. 18, 1993, P245+.
See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Conception that the Corporation is a Nexus of Contracts, and the Dual Nature of the Firm, The Journal of Corporation Law, Op. Cit., P829.
See Douglas M. Branson, The Death of Contractarianism and the Vindication of Structure and Authority in Corporate Governance and Corporate Law, in Lawrence E. Mitchell, ed., Progressive Corporate Law, Westview Press, 1995, P95. 持有这一观点的学者阵营也相当之多，代表性的人物包括Machen, Mitchell, Eisenberg, Blair等等。兹不一一引述。
