最后，主张彻底放弃成本—收益分析以及“监管记分卡”。帕克尔（Parker，2003）把正在成为主流法学学派的成本—收益分析理论称为“监管计分卡”学派（regulatory scorecards）。监管计分卡是成本—收益分析的一个组成部分（sub－species of cost－benefit analysis）。典型的成本—收益分析是对一个项目或规章的成本和收益长达数百页的叙述性描述。监管记分卡是对这数百页分析中的成本、收益、净收益和拯救每一个生命的成本的一个摘要性统计。帕克尔认为，监管记分卡存在重大错误：一是对监管收益的贴现是错误的和反监管的；二是监管分析存在选择性偏见；三是对成本和收益的事前预测相对于实际的衡量是误导性的；四是数量分析导致了忽视质量方面的收益；五是总体上低估拯救生命的价值，或者低估了拯救生命的数量，抑或包含了两者；六是成本—收益分析出现这些严重的错误是不可避免的。监管记分卡忽视了监管对社会成本和风险分配的影响，忽视和排除了社会存在的大量的不确定性。总之，监管记分卡内在的缺陷，应该放弃监管记分卡[32]（P．1346－1356）。
综上所述，理论是在不断的争论中逐步发展和深化。因此，桑斯坦（Cass R．Sunstein，2001）描述了从20世纪70年代明显的无视成本的环境监管，现在已经转移到更加注重成本—收益分析原则。成本—收益默认原则对监管政策作出了巨大的改变，既因为对于法律案件的实证作用，也因为对监管系统的效率结果[33]（P．1656－1663）。无论好坏，成本—收益分析（和他所有内在的价值假设）已经被国会批准，并应用于监管中[32]（P．1355）。同时，美国有超过半数的州政府和州议会在法律和监管政策制定中使用成本—收益分析[34]（P．1293－1392）。成本—收益分析现在在学术界和政府拥有的承认和信任水平，在三十年之前是不可想象的[35]（P．129－184）。所以，在学术界，成本—收益分析已经成为讨论、评述和分析法律、行政命令、规章和政策问题的主要方法[36]（P．431－495）。同时，监管影响评估、监管对经济、社会和环境的影响分析、成本—收益分析、成本有效性分析和风险分析，已经成为美国、欧盟和OECD制定法律法规、规章、政策和指引的理论基础，并接受制度实践对这些理论的考验[37]（P．468－482）。（注：Jonathan B Wiener,Better Regulation in Europe,Current Legal Problems,Vol．59，No．6（2006）,pp．447－516．Wiener在这篇文章中，比较了美国、欧盟关于监管影响分析的法律规定、实施机制和分析方法。他认为，法律移植对各国法律改革起很大作用，学者在法律移植中发挥了重要作用，学者通过论文、国际会议和学校互访等方式，讨论一个相关的法律概念或法律框架，逐步达成一致。法律移植在欧盟更好的监管改革是从美国、欧盟成员国的英国、芬兰和荷兰，以及OECD等运用监管影响分析和成本－收益分析方法引入的一项制度。同时，他认为，相同的监管影响分析（RIA）的木桶，并不必然产生同样的红酒（p.453）。）
【作者简介】
席涛，中国政法大学教授。
【注释】George J．Stigler,The Theory of Economic Regulation,1971,Bell Journal of Economics and Management,Vol．2,No．1．
Peltzman,Sam,Towards a More General Theory of Regulation,1976,Journal of Law and Economics,Vol．19,No．2．
Glaeser,Edward,and Andrei Shleifer,The Rise of the Regulatory State,2003,Journal of Economic Literature,Vol．41,No．2．
Cass R．Sunstein,Congress,Constitutional Moments,and the Cost－benefit State,1996,Stanford Law Review,Vol．48,No．2．
Peter L．Strauss,Place of Agencies in Government:Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch,1984,Columbia Law Review,Vol．84,No．3．
De Muth,Christopher C．,and Ginsburg,Douglas H．,White House Review of Agency Rulemaking,1986,Harvard Law Review,Vol．99,No．5．
Richard H．Pildes and Cass R．Sunstein,Reinventing the Regulatory State,1995,The University Of Chicago Law Review,Vol．62,No．1．
James F．Blumstein,Regulatory Review by the Executive Office of the President:An Overview and Policy Analysis of Current Issues,2001,Duke Law Journal,Volume．51,No．3．
Elena Kagan,Presidential Administration,2001,Harvard Law Review,Vol．114,No．8．
Steven Croley,White House Review of Agency Rulemaking:An Empirical Investigation,2003,The University of Chicago Law Review,Vol．70,No．3．
Nicholas Bagley,Richard Revesz,Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State,2006,Columbia Law Review,Vol．106,No．6．
Lisa Schultz Bressman＆Michael P．Vandenbergh,In-side the Administrative State:A Critical Look at the Practice of Presidential Control,2006,Michigan Law Review,Vol．105,No．1．
Alan B．Morrison,OMB Interference with Agency Rule-making:The Wrong Way to Write A Regulation,1986,Harvard Law Review,Vol．99,No．5．
Peter L．Strausst and Cass R．Sunsteintt,The Role of The President and OMB in Informal Rulemaking,1986,Administrative Law Review,Vol．38,No．2．
Peter L．Strauss,Presidential Rulemaking,1997,Chicago－Kent Law Review,Vol．72,No．4．
Peter L．Strauss,Overseer,or“The Decider”?The President in Administrative Law,2007,The George Washington Law Review,Vol．75,No．4．
Mathew D．Mc Cubbins,Roger G．Noll,and Barry R．Weingas,t“Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control．”1987,Journal of Law,Economics,and Organization,Vol．3．
Richard H．Pildes and Cass R．Sunstein,Reinventing the Regulatory State,1995,The University of Chicago Law Review,Volume．62,No．1．
Cass R．Sunstein,Congress,Constitutional Moments,and the Cost－benefit State,1996,Stanford Law Re-view,Vol．48,No．2．
John D．Graham,Saving Lives through Administrative Law and Economics,2008,University of Pennsylvania Law Review,Volume 157,Number 2．
Richard A．Posner,Cost－Benefit Analysis:Definition,Justification,and Comment on Conference Papers,2000,Journal of Legal Studies,Vol．29,No．2．
Matthew D．Adler,Eric A．Posner,Rethinking Cost－Benefit Analysis,1999,Yale Law Journal,Vol．109,No．2．
Eric A．Posner,Controlling Agencies with Cost－Benefit Analysis:A Positive Political Theory Perspective,2001,The University of Chicago Law Review,Vol．68,No．4．
Gary S．Becker,A Comment on the Conference on Cost－Benefit Analysis,2000,Journal of Legal Studies,Vol．29,No．2．
Eric A．Posner,Cost－Benefit Analysis as a Solution toa Principal－Agent Problem,2001,Administrative Law Review,Vol．53,No．1．
Robert W．Hahn,and John A．Hird,The Costs and Benefits of Regulation:Review and Synthesis,1990,Yale Journal on Regulation,Vol．8．
Frank Ackerman and Lisa Heinzerling,Pricing the Priceless:Cost－Benefit Analysis of Environmental Protection,2000,University of Pennsylvania Law Review,Vol,150,No．5．
Thomas D．Hopkins,Costs of Federal Regulation,1992,Journal of Regulation and Social Costs,Vol．2,No．1．
Henry S．Richardson,The Stupidity of the Cost－Benefit Standard,2000,Journal of Legal Studies,Vol．29,No．2．
David Copp,The Justice and Rationale of Cost－Benefit Analysis,1987,Theory and Decisions,Vol．23．
Lisa Heinzerling,Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions,1992,The Yale Law Journal,Vol．107,No．7．
Richard W．Parker,Grading the Government,2003,The University of Chicago Law Review,Vol．70,No．5．
Cass R．Sunstein,Cost－Benefit Default Principles,2001,Michigan Law Review,Vol．99．
Matthew D．Adler,Risk,Death and Harm:The Norma-tive Foundations of Risk Regulation,2003,Minnesota Law Review,Vol．87,No．5．
Amy Sinden,The Economics of Endangered Species:Why Less Is More in the Economic Analysis of Critical Habitat Designations,2004,Harvard Environmental Law Review,Vol．28．
Jane B．Baron＆Jeffrey L．Dunoff,Against Market Rationality:Moral Critiques of Economic Analysis in Legal Theory,1996,Cardozo Law Review,Vol．17,No．3．
Jonathan B Wiener,Better Regulation in Europe,2006,Current Legal Problems,Vol．59,No．6．
