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Sartre never devoted systematic attention to the question of human dignity. His relevant concern is mostly reflected in his Existentialism and Humanism, on which my discussion here is focused. For a book by an existentialist author bearing the title of human dignity, see Gabriel Marcel, The Existential Background of Human Dignity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), pp. 128-135, 158. The discussion on human dignity there is only sporadic, however, and does little to clarify the meaning of the concept.
Jean-Paul Sartre, “Existentialism and Humanism”. In Walter Kaufmann (ed.), Existentialism: From Dostoevsky to Sartre (Cleveland/New York: World Publising Co., 1956), pp. 291, 306.
Ibid., p. 292.
Ibid., pp. 308-309.
Ibid., p. 310. For a thorough discussion on the existentialist view of human existence and freedom, which leads to a peculiar notion of responsibility, see Sartre’s Being and Nothingness: A Phenomenological Essay on Ontology (trans Hazel E. Barnes, New York: Washington Square Press, 1956), pp. 76, 565, 598, 603, 797.
Spiegelberg, ibid., pp. 51-53. For a critique of Heidegger and Sartre in comparison with Confucianism, see Yu Ying-shih 1989: 24-48; about a comparison between western and Chinese philosophy on moral personality, see Xu Fu-guan (徐复观), The Basic Characters of Confucian Spirit, Its Limitations and Rebirth 《儒家精神之基本性格、及其限定与新生》 (Hong Kong: Minzhu Pinlunshe, 1951), pp. 1-10.
Moltmann, ibid., 15-31; Montgomery, ibid., pp. 208-217.
Meyer and Parent (ed.), The Constitution of Rights: Human Dignity and American Values (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992).
Gewirth, ibid., pp. 10-28.
For a similar distinction between “intrinsic” and “extrinsic” dignity made in the Christian context, see Brad Stetson, Human Dignity and Contemporary Liberalism (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998), pp. 15-17.
Gewirth, ibid., p. 10; compare with Melden, ibid., p. 31.
The only exceptions are those made in the Christian context, see e.g. Moltmann, ibid., p. 10, Montgomery, ibid., p. 192.
See Zhu Yilu (朱义禄), Confucian Ideal Personality and Chinese Culture 《儒家理想人格与中国文化》 (Shenyang: Liaoning Education Press, 1991), pp. 1-18. The earliest source I can find that explicitly attempts to connect the western concept of human dignity with Chinese Ren Ge is Zhang Dongsun (张东荪), Rationality and Democracy 《理性与民主》 (Hong Kong: Longmen Shudian, 1946), pp. 47-82.
See Zhang Dainian (张岱年), “The Concept of Human Dignity in the Classical Chinese Philosophy” (“中国古典哲学中的人格尊严思想”), International Confucianism Study 《国际儒学研究》 2 (1997), p. 18.
R.M. Hare, Freedom and Reason (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), pp. 10-27.
See, respectively, Gewirth, ibid., pp. 12-14, and Stetson, ibid., pp. 15-17.
“Gentleman” (Junzi) here is gender neutral. Unless specified or made clear by the context, none of the masculine words in this paper suggest any sex bias.
For confining the notion of virtues to socially beneficial human abilities and propensities, see Cheng, ibid., pp. 145-146.
Analects, 7: 22; see Wing-tsit Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 32.
Mencius, 6A: 6.
Liang Qichao (梁启超), History of Political Thought in the Pre-Qin Period 《先秦政治思想史》 (Taipei: Zhonghua Shuju, 1972), p. 381.
As to the Confucian distinction between “xiao ren” and “Junzi”, see Yu Ying-shih, ibid., pp. 160-177.
Principle of the Mean, sec. 3; also see sec. 4, 5, 9. In addition, “a gentleman follows the path of Mean, and feels no regret even though his virtue is unknown and neglected by the world.” In the Principle of the Mean, sec. 11, trans. James Legge, The Four Books (Hong Kong: Wei Tung Book Co., 1971), p. 7.
Analects: 9: 29; see Legge, ibid., p. 126.
Analects, 7: 38.
Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (2nd Ed., Notre Dame: University of Nortre Dame Press, 1984), pp. 222-223.
Principle of the Mean, sec. 10; see Legge, ibid., p. 7.
Thus, “a gentleman seeks the Way rather than material support.... What worries him is not poverty, but that he fails to attain the Way” (Analects, 15: 32).
Mencius, 7A: 9; see Legge, ibid., p. 305.
Principle of the Mean, sec. 14; see Legge, ibid., p. 11.
Principle of the Mean, sec. 10; trans. Legge, ibid., p. 7.
“A gentleman seeks in himself, while a littleman seeks in the others.” In Analects, 15: 21; see Legge, ibid., p. 137. “A gentleman must first acquire the virtues before he may require them in the others; he must rid himself of the vices before he can prohibit them in the others.” In Great Learning, sec. 10; see Legge, ibid., p. 12.
Shen Du; see Great Learning, sec. 6.
Mencius, 2A: 2; see Legge, ibid., p. 63.
Mencius, 3B: 2.
J.L. Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (London: Penguin Books, 1977), pp. 15-49.
Xunzi, “Kingly Government”, Ch. 9; see Homer H. Dubs, The Works of Hsuntze (Taipei: Cheng-wen Publishing Co., 1966), p. 136.
That is, the lack of belief in the original human sin and the resulting guilt, see Max Weber, The Religion of China (trans. Hans H. Gerth, New York: Free Press, 1951), p. 235.
See Bloom, ibid., pp. 104-108.
Mencius, 6A: 17.
Mencius, 6A:14.
Donald J. Munro, The Concept of Man in Early China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969), pp. 49-83.
See Mencius, 1A: 4.
Analects, 10: 17. I owe this example to Professor Ni Peimin in response to a question raised by Professor Li Chenyang at the panel discussion at the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy.
See Peter L. Berger, Brigitte Berger, & Hansfriend Kellner, The Homeless Mind: Modernization and Consciousness (New York: Random House, 1973), pp. 89-95, for an argument of similar conceptual understanding in the West and for an illuminating discussion of how the process of modernity and the disintegration of traditional social institutions led to the transition from the particularistic concept of “honor” to the universalistic concept of “human dignity”.
Mencius, 2A: 6.
Analects, 15: 24.
Analects, 12: 2.
For a general argument that “good” is an indefinable, non-natural quality, see G.E. Moore, Principia Ethica (Amherst, New York: Prometheus Books, 1902 ), pp. 2-21, and further discussion in Mackie, ibid., pp. 50-63.
This is recognized even by the utilitarianist J.S. Mill, who argues that the “sense of dignity, which all human beings possess in one form or other” is identified with one’s “unwillingness ... to sink into what he feels to be a lower grade of existence.” In Utilitarianism, Ch. 2; from Spiegelberg, ibid., p. 64, n. ii.
“A gentleman is friendly, but do not follow blindly.” In Principle of the Mean, sec. 10; see Legge, ibid., p. 7.
Analects, 20: 2; see Legge, ibid., p. 183.
Ibid.
Principle of the Mean, sec. 33.
“A gentleman can stay with his poverty; but a poor littleman will do anything .” In Analects, 15: 2.
For a Greek but similar description of the “great man”, see Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics (trans. David Ross, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), pp. 89-95. Compare Max Weber, The Religion of China (trans. Hans H. Gerth, New York: Free Press, 1951), pp. 228-229 for the contrast between “shame culture” and “guilt culture” in the west, which presupposes the original sin in human nature.
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