|
3.2. The Prescriptions of Dignity: Individual Cultivation and Universal Respect
The Confucian concept of human dignity, of course, not only implies the factual recognition of the unique human possibility of becoming a gentleman, but also bestow value on the realization of such possibility. And, like every value, it depends on the evaluative effort of the subject itself.[80] An uncultivated person has perhaps the equal potential to become a sage or a villain; it encumbers on human beings themselves to value the former and condemn the latter. The great Confucian authority, Xunzi, once says that “Water and fire have essences (Qi), but not life; herbs and trees have life, but no knowledge; birds and beasts have knowledge, but no sense of justice (Yi). Man has an essence, life, knowledge and, in addition, a sense of justice; thus he is the noblest on earth”.[81] But even if we are convinced that human beings indeed possess the innate sense of justice, it does not necessarily follow that it is the most noble; to thus value mankind above everything else, which gives rise to the unique pride for being a man, is itself a value judgment. It is an anthropocentric view of homo sapiens, individually and as a whole, as it means simply that we value human lives higher than all other things. This (and, to a Confucianist, only this) life is worth living, precisely because it is believed to be a process of continuous actualization of the unique potential worth present in every human life. The “radical world optimism”[82] is the very essence of Confucian and, more generally, Chinese humanism.
The belief in human dignity presupposes an irreducible worth attached to every person insofar as s/he is a human being. This is best illustrated in the Mencian theory of human nature,[83] which enables Mencius to develop a positive doctrine of human value. Mencius assumes that everyone is born with a noble body together with the capacity to develop it. Man is set apart from other animals perhaps by only a slight difference, yet it is precisely this small difference that makes man unique. The unique value of man lies not in his material body--because that he shares with all other animals, but exclusively in his moral faculties as embodied in his heart-mind (Xin). Responsible for moral and rational thinking, the heart-mind is the noblest organ endowed by human being and, unlike the material body whose advantages are unequally inherited by different individuals, the moral heart-mind is endowed equally in all men and women. As a result, “everyone possesses in himself the noble value”.[84] The individual moral differences lie not in the natural endowment, but in the posterior development of the innate potentials. Mencius distinguishes the “noble” or “great” body (the heart-mind where humanity resides) from the “ignoble” or “small” body (sensuous organs giving rise to passion and desire). “While a gentleman follows his great body, a littleman is driven by his small body.”[85] Unlike a littleman who is preoccupied with his selfish material desires, a gentleman takes care to cultivate his sublime moral character by pursuing humanity and justice, which enables him to lead a life that is worthy of his noble nature. Humanity and justice are true nobility, which is endowed from Heaven and cannot be substituted by human nobility (such as high social status and comfortable material life). While the human nobility is contingent on individual fortune and limited necessarily to a few, the inherent nobility of Heaven is absolute and universal to all human beings.
Now it may be contended that the Confucianists valued not so much the potentials inherent in man as the actually developed qualities exhibited in a gentleman. Munroe observes, for example, that traditional Chinese society had consistently rejected the ideas of democracy and mass political participation precisely because of the Confucian emphasis that only those who had actually developed virtues had the right to participate in politics.[86] Merits in arguments of this type aside, however, they cannot support the assertion that the Confucianists did not value the pure potentials in every human life. There are plenty of passages in the classical Confucian texts that point to the contrary. For Confucius, human beings in general worth more than anything on the earth, and cannot be arbitrarily harmed or destroyed even by the highest ruler of the state. He strongly condemned, for example, the custom of using figurines in the kings’ burial because the figurines were made to look too similar to real people[87] (instead of only those with gentlemanly outlook). When a horse stable caught on fire, he asked, without mentioning horse, whether anyone (rather than only men of elevated moral status) had been hurt.[88] Likewise Mencius clearly sees the same worth in a human baby in his famous example where he attempts to illustrate the existence of humanity by the spontaneous feeling of compassion.[89] Suppose we witness a baby approaching a water well, he argues, we would be prompted by our natural compassion to go forward and save her from the danger.[90] Had Mencius not valued the potentials innate in a human being, we would seem to have no reason to save the baby, for she is yet to develop any of her unique human potentials. In this case, an undeveloped human child should not worth more than other animals, and we should not feel more compelled to save her than to save, say, a cat about to fall into a well. But Mencius would argue, I believe,to the contrary: whenever a human life, whose multifarious potentials are yet to be actualized, faces such danger, the matter is of an entirely different order. Thus, although Mencius intended to use this example to illustrate the presence of humanity in every human being as a potential virtue, it can be plausibly extended to show the general Confucian concern and respect for the innate human potentials. Whether a person has actually developed these potentials (as he ought to), they are regarded to have value by themselves and deserve respect from others. In the Confucian view, then, the potential virtues innate in every human being are an inseparable part of human dignity.
On the other hand, as a value concept, human dignity also carries a prescriptive component. It places high premium on certain potentials innate in every human person and treats them as the irreplaceable good, which positively requires the individuals to cultivate these unique potentials by learning and practice in order to become fully developed men and, at the same time, to respect the same potentials in every other man and woman. Further, the concept can be plausibly so construed as to demand that the state and society should respect, protect, and help cultivate the virtues in every individual, thus providing everyone with certain basic rights, both in the negative (liberty) and positive (claims) senses. The prescriptions entailed by human dignity, then, contain three distinct aspects: the self, the other, and the collective.
First, a Confucian gentleman is a person who values his inborn virtues and takes care to preserve and develop what he believes to be noble in him, and he is said to have developed dignity precisely because he act in accordance with his innate nobility. Significantly, the Confucianists did not stop here, but further required the conscious cultivation and actualization of these inborn capacities. To see this we need only mention the classic Great Learning (Da Xue), which prescribes a systematic program for self-cultivation (Xiu Shen). Having cultivated the virtues, a Confucian gentleman practices and displays them overtly in his daily actions, giving rise to an appearance that commands respect from others. Thus, the Confucian dignity combines both the internal and external aspects of a human being; it presupposes the potential unique to mankind and, taking its value for granted, requires every man and woman to make a good effort to develop it in daily life. When the dignity is fully developed, it would spontaneously display itself in one’s appearance and behavior, as a part of acquired habits.
Second, the gentleman’s sense of justice presupposes his conscious recognition of the same basic worth in all other persons that command his respect. The respect for others is the natural extension of his self-respect, since a just man must obey the basic rule of reciprocity, which Confucius takes to be the Way for every gentleman: “whatever you do not wish others impose upon you, nor do you impose on others”.[91] Thus, when his student asks about the practice of virtue, he says: “When you leave home [to govern a people], behave [cautiously] as if you were receiving a great guest; to employ the people as if you were assisting a great ceremony. Do not impose on the others what you do not wish the other to impose on you”.[92] If a gentleman wants himself to be respected, then, he must first respect others and treat them as human beings who, like him, are endowed with moral and intellectual faculties capable of being fully developed. To imitate the absolute justice of Heaven, a gentleman must refrain from doing anything that might prevents anyone from actualizing his/her potential and achieving full dignity. Thus, his respect is due not only to cultivated gentlemen with comparable moral achievements, but also to every ordinary person, whose innate capacities make human improvements always possible.
But even that is not enough. For a gentleman is concerned not only with interpersonal moral conduct, but also with the ideal state and society in which he prefers to live. While he respects every human being in the universe, it would be quite rational for him to require others to pay reciprocal respect for himself. Further, he should also like to be able to require that we all (not only he himself) respect the basic dignity of any other person. Human dignity requires universal respect, from which no one ought to be excluded. For this purpose, recognizing the weaknesses and limitations in individual human beings, a gentleman should concern himself with setting up proper laws and social institutions to secure such an end, that is, to prevent everyone from taking actions that would diminish anyone else’s (and his/her own) dignity. These laws and institutions establish what are in nature private rights, because they protect the dignity of every citizen against private encroachment from others. Last and most important, he should be concerned, above all, with establishing fundamental rules that can prevent these institutions themselves, especially the state, from exercising powers in such a way as to defeat the very aim for which they are erected. We thus need a constitution that can limit the powers of the state and social organizations, and provides basic rights to every individual against public encroachment. Although, historically, the Confucianists were not always conscious of the need for the institutional balance of powers, it seems to be reasonable to derive these basic institutional requirements from the Confucian concept of dignity.
|
