|
4.1. The Primacy of Rights over Duty in Western Liberalism
Belief in human dignity is often implicitly assumed in modern liberalism, a dominant ideology in the western liberal democracies. On June 27, 1998, for example, President Clinton made the following remarks in the historic city, Xi’an, the first stop in his recent trip to China: “Respect for the worth, the dignity, the potential and the freedom of every citizen is a vital source of America’s strength and success.... In this global information age ... a commitment to providing all human beings the opportunity to develop their full potential is vital to the strength and success of the new China as well.” Yet, paradoxical enough, modern liberalism seems to be incapable of providing a solid philosophical foundation for the widely held belief in human dignity. It is simply difficult to find any worth or dignity in man from its basically negative view of human nature. And, without dignity and worth, many basic and now widely accepted rights would lose their legitimate ground.
It is well known that the western idea of individual rights is originally derived from the social contract theory of Thomas Hobbes.[108] In his Leviathan, Hobbes postulates a state of nature, in which egoistical individuals, with limited resources (including material goods and honor) and without mutual trust and a common government, find themselves trapped in “a war of all against all”. To escape such a miserable condition, every person rationally enters a compact with every other person to put themselves under a sovereign. From such a original promise, enforced by the common power, is derived a set of natural laws which command each individual to keep peace and observe the terms of compact. The duties thus prescribed, however, is strictly conditioned upon the original purpose for which the compact was made at the first place: the preservation of individual life. This is indeed the “inalienable” natural right that Hobbes finds in every rational human being. Every human government must work toward the preservation and security of life; failure to do so constitutes a fundamental breach by the sovereign, which brings back the state of nature, where every individual is absolved of all duties toward others and regains natural liberty. The primacy of natural right over duty is obvious, as there is no equivalent “natural duty”, but only duties derived from rights. The notion of natural right is further extended by John Locke to include the right to liberty and property. Although, in Locke’s theory, the natural laws maintain their binding force in the state of nature, the fundamental asymmetry between rights and duty would remain if the biblical authority of God is left out.
Despite its wide acceptance today, the social contract theory of rights contains several difficulties.[109] First, without presupposing the a priori validity of transcendent divine command, the existence of human duty would depend entirely upon the prudential calculations of one’s self-interest, and is thus made secondary to rights. Among other things, the Hobbesian theory can support only a weak notion of duty, that is, a person observe his duty not for its own sake, but only because it furthers his selfish interest, and his duty stops as soon as the cost of obeying it apparently outweighs the benefits. Prudential considerations, however, depend on the actors’ foresight and circumstances in which they are situated, and the ensuing uncertainty necessarily undermines the binding force of certain basic duties (e.g., “Don’t steal” or “Act justly under all circumstances”). Second, without the sanction of an external divine authority, which requires belief in a particular religion,[110] the primacy of natural right of self-preservation in the Hobbesian theory makes it difficult to even accommodate other widely held rights, such as personal liberty and property. If human beings are by nature selfish, unjust, vile, and rapacious, it seems doubtful whether they are worthy of any rights other than bare preservation. Finally, and most significant for our purpose, it seems to be very difficult to consistently derive from this theory the widely held “recognition of the inherent dignity” in the Preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, or respect for “the worth, the dignity, the potential and the freedom of every citizen”, to which President Clinton alluded in his China trip. If everyone is, as Hobbes depicts, an egoistical animal preoccupied with his self-interest, and his apparent observance of law and duties arises only from the fear for the punishments of the sovereign power, then it is difficult to find any worth and dignity in human beings. If men act by nature like thieves and robbers, then the mere appearance of law-abidingness does not change who they really are, and few would find that theft and robbery are worthy or dignified way of life.
The basic problem with the modern liberal theory of rights is, then, its low estimation of human being contrary to the widely held practical beliefs.[111] Such an initial assumption makes it too difficult to derive the notion of innate dignity or worth, and makes basic duties too easily overwhelmed by the prudential concerns of self-interests. For this reason modern liberalism is criticized, perhaps with some justice, for adopting an unnecessarily dim view of human nature and for ignoring the inherent moral potential in a human being. By undermining social duty and legal constraints on personal gratification of desires, it is charged,[112] the radical individualistic tendency in modern liberalism dehumanizes human beings. I argue below that Confucianism, while fundamentally a duty ethics and despite its own problems, provides a salutary correction to such a tendency and, if properly construed, is capable of accommodating a well-balanced theory of rights.
4.2. From Universal Duty to Universal Rights: A Confucian Transformation?
We have already seen that, as a consistent implication of the Confucian belief, the universal respect for human dignity carries the demand that the state and society must protect and help cultivate the innate virtues in every individual human being, and this task is probably best achieved by providing a constitutional system of basic rights. It is nevertheless true that such a system of rights has been conspicuously lacking throughout the Chinese history. It appears as if that, by emphasizing social duty, the traditional China were diametrically opposed to the modern west. The reason for such difference lies partly in the different conception of equality. As Munroe points out,[113] the classical Chinese philosophers recognized only natural equality in the sense that everyone is born with innate virtues as unique human potentials, but denied actual equality that all men could in fact develop their nature to such an equal extent as to entitle them to equal respect. In Confucianism, this view had justified the hierarchical structure of society and the denial of popular participation in government. By focusing on the capacities that the people have in fact developed through learning and education, the Confucianists had limited the participation in government to a small group of elites, and ignored the notion of innate moral rights developed in the West, which entitles every adult to some form of participation. As a result, Confucianism had never developed an explicit notion of “rights”--not modern political right to participation, not the Lockean right to property in virtue of one’s labor, not even the Hobbesian natural right to self-preservation. Similar to the classical and Medieval counterparts in the West, Confucianism was decidedly duty-orientated. In what the Chinese view as a just society, one’s “right” (that is, social, economic and political privileges) was to be made strictly proportional to the degree of actually developed worth and ability. The state and society must be run by the most virtuous and worthy, who almost always remain a small minority, and it seemed to them patently absurd to allow the ignorant, selfish, and morally immature mass to choose their own leaders. To the contrary, Confucius and his followers were simply concerned with how to make men virtuous and, at the same time, make the virtuous men rule.
In a sense the Confucianists were quite right. If one is truly incompetent in a certain vocation (e.g. political participation), then both justice and common prudence require that he should refrain from engaging in it, but leave it instead to those who are capable. And mere rights, freedom and participation are not the only things about which the people ought to care; indeed these things alone are not even sufficient to sustain social and political institutions.[114] Rather, they presuppose something else as their foundation, that is, the development of the people’s virtues and the primary means by which the virtues are acquired: proper education and upbringing. After all, hardly anyone wants to live in a society full of “rights” and “freedom”, but bereft of basic norms, values, and a sense of duty--a society in which everyone feels free to do whatever s/he wants, without any moral constraint. Such a society would be necessarily one of “littlemen”, among whom numerous conflicts, strives, infringements and oppressions are bound to occur. On the other hand, a democracy worthy of its name presupposes a society of gentlemen who, having developed their virtues and become mature citizens, are capable of exercising their “rights” intelligently. Thus, for good reasons, self-cultivation has occupied the central position of Confucianism; it is the very path toward the making of virtuous and dignified citizens.
To be consistent with the Confucian assumption of natural equality, however, even xiao ren (“littleman”) is, after all, a ren (person) and must be treated as a human being with the inborn potential virtues. For those who choose to accept the Confucian view of man must believe that every man and woman is equally endowed with the innate virtues and think highly of them.[115] Even a littleman deserves some respect for his innate nobility in virtue of being a human--better, nobler and more worthy than other animals. Thus, to a Confucian gentleman, it is morally inadequate to treat anyone--littleman, even a criminal, not excepted--like a mere animal.[116] The failure to cultivate one’s virtues should never lead a gentleman to merely despise one’s person, but should rather urge him to help the littleman by all means to cultivate the virtues and become a gentleman. The belief in human dignity may further inspire a gentleman to devise a better system of education, among other things, in order that everyone can have a reasonable opportunity to actualize his/her virtues and to maximize, as it were, his dignity.[117] At least, social and political schemes should never be designed to merely put down a littleman and make him docile simply for the sake of societal peace and order. As everyone is endowed by Heaven with the innate virtues which afford him some basic dignity, everyone is an end in himself, more than a tool for any other end, however grandiose.
|
