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3.3. The Sense of Dignity in a “Shame Culture”
Is there any ground for holding this fundamentally optimistic self-evaluation and for believing that the distinctive virtues in a human being make him/her nobler than all other animals? It is true that, even if we can prove that we are in fact endowed with the Confucian virtues (e.g. the innate abilities to acquire, among other things, humanity and justice), we are by no means logically compelled to confer highest value on them or even regard them as “good” at all.[93] Without endorsing existentialism as a whole, we may nevertheless agree that human beings are free to value or devalue everything existing. Nor is it is feasible to empirically demonstrate--in the strict sense of the word--the universal existence of these virtues in every individual person. Yet at least a partial vindication can be made to support the self-consistency of holding such a belief. That is, for those who have succeeded in developing their virtues, they do feel the existence of the inner worth, as shown in the psychological satisfaction and self-confidence; on the other hand, if they undertake actions contrary to the opinion they hold about their moral nobility, they will have a distinctive experience of feeling degraded. Further, even ordinary men and women do have a sense of dignity within themselves which, though perhaps not consciously articulated, shows itself when their self-esteem is harmed by degrading treatments. Thus, it does seem that some sense of dignity is universally felt in every human being.[94] This leads us to inquire the third and the last dimension of human dignity: the emotive dimension, which contains both positive and negative aspects.
First, as stated earlier, the quality of justice in a Confucian gentleman gives him the sense of moral independence, and allows him to correspond with the Way of Heaven without having to blindly follow others.[95] This presupposes a considerable degree of confidence in his own moral righteousness, which is to be exhibited in easy but dignified outlook that naturally commands respect from others. In the words of Confucius, one becomes a gentleman “when he maintains a dignified ease without being arrogant; when he is majestic without being fierce”.[96] As he explains further, “Whether [the gentleman] has to do with many people or few, or with things great or small, he does not dare to indicate any disrespect;--is not this to maintain a dignified ease without any arrogance? He adjusts his clothes and cap, and throws a dignity into his looks, so that, thus dignified, he is looked at with awe;--is not this to be majestic without being fierce?”[97] The “dignified ease” (Tai) here stands for an appearance of magnificent composure that comes from the gentleman’s confidence in his own worth.
Second, negatively, a gentleman refrains from injustice because he feels the shame in doing unjust things to others--things that do not worth his effort and the commission of which would make him feel degraded. “Hence a gentleman feels no shame upon self-examination, and brings no embarrassment to his own will”.[98] And freedom from any sense of moral shame gives him both the confidence and courage that are found lacking in a littleman. The conscious feeling of self-respect within oneself, as reflected in the sense of shame, distinguishes a gentleman from a littleman. While a littleman can do anything, however low, without feeling degraded, a gentleman is fully conscious of the worth inherent in him and will do only those things that are consistent with or can help actualize his worth.[99] For this reason he regards himself highly.[100] If a gentleman committed a certain action that was not worthy of his nobility, then he merely degraded himself to a level lower than his intrinsic moral quality--a degradation for which he would feel shameful. Thus, Confucius insists that a gentleman should “maintain the sense of shame in his own conduct”;[101] those who would do anything without feeling the shame lack the very moral quality to do the right thing. As Mencius puts it aptly: “A man must first know what he ought not to do, before he can do what he ought to do”.[102] And both Confucius and Mencius have furnished examples for the kind of things that will make a gentleman feel shameful. “A gentleman”, for example, “thinks it shameful if his words exceed his deeds”,[103] because he would then make false claim on something which he did not do. And “a gentleman feels shameful if the prestige he receives exceeds his virtue”.[104] Likewise, “it is shameful if, serving as an official in the court, he cannot practice the principle of good government” because he would then receive many benefits for doing nothing;[105] for Confucius, “a good minister should serve his king through the Way and, finding it impossible, retire”.[106]
It may be objected that the sentiments for dignity is not universal, but present only in those cultivated gentlemen who have succeeded in developing their innate virtues. Most often, however, even for those who do not believe in human virtues or make any conscious efforts to cultivate them, they nevertheless feel offended when they think that they are treated less than what they deserve, implying that they do attribute some worth to themselves--though perhaps unconsciously and inconsistently. This is particularly obvious when they are mistreated by others. Even a beggar would feel degraded if someone throws food on the floor for him to pick up, as if the latter were feeding an animal.[107] As long as one has not lost the minimal sense of self-esteem, he would feel offended if his employer treats him merely as a machine for producing profit or government agents push him around rudely, as if they were taming a wild beast. In these situations one would feel humiliated because he thinks that he deserves better treatment than what a mere animal or machine receives. Although he may purport to ignore or even consciously reject the worth inherent in him, thereby degrading himself and inviting despises from others, his aversion against the maltreatment seems to imply that he still thinks himself to have some value. Thus, it can at least be argued that the sense of dignity is not limited to those cultivated persons; rather, it is universally found in every human being, even though the degree of such sentiment may vary. The apparent availability of such a feeling in every human being may not establish conclusively the existence of innate human virtues, but does suggest the reasonableness of the Confucian belief in the basic worth of human person.
What is human dignity, then? What does it amount to say that human being is a dignified creature? According to Confucianism, man is dignified because he is born with a set of innate virtues unique to human race and the capacity of fully realizing these virtues that make him a mature person, and because he respects himself (and other men and women) by attributing high values to these unique virtues, which lead him to consciously develop them. Human dignity is then a composite idea that consists in the innate potentials believed to be uniquely endowed by every human being and held at the highest irreducible value, plus the extent to which these potentials is practically realized through conscious self-cultivation. An action is dignity-enhancing if it cultivates, practices or exhibits one’s virtues; it is dignity-reducing (thus degrading) if it fails to exercise virtues or prevents anyone from cultivating or exercising virtues. Those who adopt this positive view of mankind, seeing the same worth and virtues in themselves, take life-long efforts to cultivate them so as to better themselves, striving to achieve the highest dignity possible for a human being. Having cultivated these virtues, they take pride in them and display an overt confidence in their daily behavior; on the other hand, if they happen to have done things that tend to diminish or prevent the realization of virtues, they would feel degraded and shameful. They assume that everyone ought to see these virtues in himself and in others as something noble and worthy, and thus make a conscious effort to respect and to cultivate them in order to make himself a better human being; failure to do so would justly invoke moral disapproval from other members of society. Finally, they further require the state and society to not only respect, protect, and refrain from degrading the dignity in every man and woman, but also provide the basic social conditions that makes it possible for everyone to attain a dignified existence.
4. The Double Implications of Human Dignity: Toward a Balanced View of Rights and Duty
It is commonly asserted, however, that the Chinese tradition in general and Confucianism in particular lacked any clear conception of rights. While this appears to be obviously true from even a cursory scan of classical Confucian works, it would be a mistake to infer that Confucianism is inherently opposed to individual rights, including basic political rights. I argue below that the Confucian concept of human dignity can accommodate the notion of rights as a device for cultivating individual virtues. To hold this view may require us to modify the traditional view of personhood and to reject the dogmatic strain within Confucianism which took the legitimacy of tradition for granted. But doing so does not undermine the basic argument that, leaving the descriptive content of human dignity open to future modifications, as mankind acquire more experience and better judgment, Confucianism can adapt itself to changing circumstances and conceptions of human nature. Indeed, with overall optimistic assumptions of human nature, Confucianism can derive a balanced view of duty and rights, and provide a more consistent foundation for the commonly held belief in human worth and dignity than modern liberalism in the West. This section is divided into two parts. First, I briefly review the western liberal theory of individual rights as represented by Hobbes, and point out its deficiencies. Second, I discuss the possibility and the necessity of deriving individual rights from the universal duty of respecting human dignity in Confucianism to make it consistent with the basic social facts.
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