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Thus, it can be plausibly argued within the Confucian framework that an ordinary person should have some right in discussing and deciding public issues that will ultimately touch upon his life, and many such issues might be plain enough to be understood by a common mind with reasonable education. Further, to become a gentleman presupposes a set of favorable social and political conditions, which had been denied to most ordinary men and women in traditional China. A person need be given the basic education and some opportunity for practice before he can intelligently participate in government. Without these opportunities, he will most likely remain a uneducated and underdeveloped “littleman”--not because he wishes to remain politically ignorant and incompetent, but because he lacks the fortune (at least a reasonably wealthy family, among other things) that is beyond his control but is nevertheless necessary for his moral development. Since the mass of people were deprived of the opportunity to become morally developed gentlemen, the apparently “just” system of merit was based ultimately on injustice. In this sense, a social and political system that guarantees a minimum right--to participate in government or otherwise--seems to provide more fairness because it can afford relatively equal opportunity for personal development of innate virtues.
Still, the notion of “rights” does not so easily fit with the dignity of a Confucian gentleman. The problem of rights lies deeper in the Chinese practice, for even a gentleman seemed to have only duties, but no reciprocal rights, before his parents, rulers and society in general. Somehow it appears inadequate--even distasteful--to a gentleman to fight for his own rights and interests, especially in the form of factions and parties, for “a gentleman is dignified, but does not wrangle”.[118] It is true that the Confucian duties are never unilateral, but always reciprocal.[119] Thus, the king and his subjects have their own duties to perform toward each other. And, if a duty (e.g., benevolence of a king) is insisted and recognized by every member of the society, then it is in effect transformed into a kind of right toward the recipient of its performance. But, in practice, such condition is hardly ever met. Generally, in a relationship between two unequal parties, the moral persuasion of duty alone is seldom sufficient to prevent the powerful party from abusing its power. As a result, contrary to equilibrium and harmony as prescribed by the Principle of the Mean, the imbalance of power frequently took place in the Chinese political history. During that period, no matter how dignified a gentleman was in private life, his dignity would disappear before the state, against which he had no protection.[120] Even private complaints must be made with caution, as Confucius himself taught: “When good government prevails in a state, one should speak and act boldly. When bad government prevails, act righteously, but speak with reserve”;[121] otherwise, one would merely put his life, together with the security and welfare of his family, in jeopardy. Before the state, then, even a gentleman could not maintain his dignity because he was compelled to refrain his action and speech out of fear for an omnipotent power. This is incompatible with the earlier image that, as a mature, just and courageous man, he should be without any fear for actions (including public speeches) he thinks to be just and proper. As a rational being, it seems, he would desire to live in a better social arrangement in which his moral autonomy can be effectively preserved. Indeed, a central theme that continues to preoccupy the contemporary neo-Confucianism has been to extend from “sageliness within” (Nei Sheng) to “kingliness without” (Wai Wang)--a political system that is conducive to the realization of endowed virtues and, thus, the enhancement of human dignity.[122]
Therefore, to consistently follow the Principle of the Mean, it seems necessary for a Confucian gentleman to adopt some institutional mechanism to guarantee his basic right in order to minimize the possibility that his dignity is degraded. Nor should a gentleman feel shame in exercising and defending his rights in democratic politics, as the partisan competitions can now be carried out through entirely peaceful and dignified constitutional procedures, without having to “wrangle”. Quite the contrary, in the spirit of the Mean, the secure independence of a gentleman requires a certain balance of power between an individual and the state, in order that nobody is so overwhelmed by the omnipotent power of the sovereign as to become the mere object of political control. When this independence is endangered by the natural disparity of power between the state and individuals, the Principle of Mean demands the implementation of a system of rights, so that the power of the stronger can be checked peacefully, and the balance restored, secured and enforced by an effective legal artifice. Such a balance can be guaranteed by a rationally designed Constitution based upon a set of fundamental values, which are shared by a people who have commonly agreed to respect the dignity of every member in society.
It may be contended, at last, that such a universalistic notion of respect could not be consistently derived from Confucianism, an ethics primarily concerned with particularistic duties. The Confucian concept of general love (Ai or Fan Ai), for example, is not to be confused with the Mohist notion of undifferentiated, universal love. Rather the Confucian love was graded according to the proximity of natural human relationships, enforced by a hierarchical system of propriety (Li), which prescribed different rules for treating one’s family members, friends and members of society. And the Confucian notion of “intimate love” (Qin) is further restricted, by definition, to be within one’s family. I argue, however, that the clear distinction between particularistic love and general respect constitute the strength rather than weakness of Confucianism. This is best seen in the context of the central concept of humanity (Ren), which the Confucianists define as a radiating process beginning naturally from within one’s family and extending to more remote social relationships.[123] According to Mencius, humanity and intimate love are applied to things of different orders: while a gentleman is humane to whole mankind, he owes special filial duty only to his family members.[124] Humanity for ordinary people (Ren Min) lies between the intimate love for one’s kin (Qin Qin) and the general care for things (Ai Wu): although humanity is above ordinary care for things, it does not carry with it the unique emotional feeling for one’s kin. For Mencius, indeed, the Mohist universalization of social relationship is to ignore one’s parents (wu fu), a fault no less grave than that committed by its egocentric opposite, the Yangist denial of all social duties (which leads to the neglect of one’s king, wu jun).[125] To the Confucianists generally, it would be against human nature to prescribe such universal Christian command as “You should love your neighbor as yourself”.[126] Among other things, love as an intense emotional feeling and obligatory commitment is necessarily limited only to a few, to whom one owes his/her special debt (parents) or who otherwise occupy prominent places in one’s family life (husband, wife, children, and other close relatives). Yet, if intimate love is to be restricted to one’s family and cannot be universalized, general respect as a personal attitude is not constrained by such physical limit, and can be reasonably required to extend over all members of society.
V. Conclusions
To sum up, the Confucian view of human dignity presupposes the potential virtues equally endowed by every human being and their irreplaceable value. Under this view, everyone has the basic dignity due to these innate virtues and deserves some respect. A Confucian gentleman, to be sure, is a person who consciously cultivates, practices and displays his virtues, and his dignified appearance invites general respect. He not only always seeks to perfect his own virtues, but also help others, within his ability, to improve theirs. Although the respect to a particular individual can be made proportional to the extent to which s/he has actually acquired human virtues, the innate human potentials, which constitute the irreducible core of human dignity, entitle everyone to at least a minimum respect. In this sense even an infant has as much innate dignity as any adult, and should receive only those treatments that will help her to develop the inborn potentials as she grows up. A criminal also has the same innate dignity, even though it is manifestly contradicted by his grievous behavior; but even he should be treated in such a manner as to help him to recover his innate virtues and to see the worth in himself, so that he becomes able to develop them on his own initiative. The legitimate actions of a state, society, or private persons are limited to those that do not inhibit anyone from attaining one’s full dignity.[127] A legitimate public institution must fulfill the duty to provide favorable social conditions and a compatible legal framework so that everyone has the basic opportunity to develop the inner worth and become a dignified member of community. To this end, society is obliged to establish an equitable constitutional system of basic rights. Construed in this way, the Confucian idea of human dignity can provide a sound philosophical basis for the modern notions of human rights and freedom, together with a balanced theory of reciprocal duties. Such a reconstruction of Confucianism can help us understand, I hope, the connection between two types of universal ideals to which the United Nations appealed half a century ago, that is, “the dignity and worth of the human person” and “the equal rights of men and women”.[128]
NANJING UNIVERSITY, P.R. CHINA.
Notes
【注释】 Parts of this paper have been presented at the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy held in Boston, MA, August 1998. I thank Professors Ni Peimin, Li Chenyang, Li Xiaorong, Jiang Tao, and Wang Qingjie for their helpful comments. I also thank Professor David Braybrooke at University of Texas at Austin and Professor Zhang Dainian at Beijing University for their encouragement and support during this project.
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