结语
国际环境法和全球环境治理目前仍然是一个充满成长活力的领域。环境问题越来越具有跨越国界的负外部性，而国际环境法的激励（成本和收益）和信息（遵约和违约）分布具有很强的不对称性，全球环境治理面临集体行动困境，各国政府和企业往往不愿或者不能积极推动国际环境法治和加强全球环境治理。为此，环境非政府组织出于环境公益保护的理想、公益捐助市场的竞争和灵活多样的信息搜集和传播渠道，积极参与并深刻影响了国际环境法和全球环境治理的宏观格局和微观制度。非政府组织通过国家和国际制度间接参与国家间环境治理法律机制有助于克服各国政府、企业激励不足和环境协定秘书处信息不畅的局限，积极推动国家间环境治理法律机制的生成、实施和演进。非政府组织的参与促进了国际法律机制的管理和服从。{29}非政府组织独立制定实施的全球环境私人规制治理机制则开发利用了多种市场力量杠杆和政府规制杠杆，影响和改变国家和企业的偏好、观念、身份认同和利益计算，从而有助于补充和加强国内法上的国家治理和国际法上的国家间治理。目前的国际环境治理制度设计应该进一步提升非政府组织的参与地位，充分发挥非政府组织在国际环境法和全球环境治理中的比较优势。与此同时，随着其参与地位的提升，非政府组织也必须进一步提高其自身的合法性和问责性。唯其如此，才能增强非政府组织参与的有效性，也才能增强国际环境法和全球环境治理的合法性、有效性和适应性。
【作者简介】
王彦志，单位为吉林大学法学院。
【参考文献】{1}See Patncia Birnie, Alan Boyle and Catherine Redgwell, International Law and the Environment, 3rd ed.，Oxford University Press, 2009，pp. 1-42.
{2}See Michele M. Betsill and Elisabeth Corell (eds.)，NGO Diplomacy： The Influence of Nongovernmental Organizations in Interna-tional Environmental Negotiations, The MIT Press, 2008, p. vii； Id.，p. 48.
{3}See Alexandre Kiss and Dinah Shelton（eds.），Guide to International Environmental Law, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2007，pp. 69-70.
{4}See Michele M. Betsill and Elisabeth Corell, supra note {2}，pp. 1 - 2.
{5}See Michele M. Betsill and Elisabeth Corell, supra note {2}．
{6}See Kal Raustiala, “The Participatory Revolution''in International Environmental Law”，21 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 537（1997），pp. 543-551.
{7}See Peter J. Spiro, “Non-Governmental Organizations and Civil Society”，in Daniel Bodansky, Jutta Brunn6e and Ellen Hey（eds.），The Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law, Oxford University Press, 2007，pp. 775-778； Anne-Marie Slaugh-ter, International Law and International Relations, 285 Recueil des Cours 9 (2000)，Martins Nijhoff Publishers, 2001，pp. 105-112.
{8}See Kal Raustiala, “States, NGOs, and International Environmental Institutions”，41 Int l. Stud.Q．719（1997），pp. 719－740； Anne-Marie Slaughter, supra note { 7 }，pp. 101-105.
{9}See Gerry Nagtzaam, The Making of International Environmental Treaties, Edward Elgar, 2009，pp. 80-155.
{1O}See Edith Brown Weiss, “Understanding Compliance with International Environmental Agreements： The Bakers Dozen Myths”，32U. Rich. L. Rev. 1555(1999)，pp.1570-1572.
{11}See David G. Victor, Kal Raustiala and Eugene B. Skolnikoff (eds.)，The Implementation and Effectiveness of International Envi-ronmental Commitments： Theory and Practice, The MIT Press, 1998，p. 21.
{12}See Mariolina Eliantonio, “The Aarhus Convention and Access to Justice for Environmental NGOs before Courts in the EU： Good News with a Bitter Aftertaste”，Effectius Newsletter, Issue 14, (2011)．
{13}See Kal Raustiala, Reporting and Review Institutions in 10 Multilateral Environmental Agreements, UNEP, 2001.
{14}See Edith Brown Weiss, supra note{10}，pp. 1579-1580； Edith Brown Weiss, “The Five International Treaties： A Living His-tory”，in Edith Brown Weiss and Harold K. Jacobson (eds.)，Engaging Countries： Strengthening Compliance with International Environ-mental Accords, The MIT Press, 1998，pp. 89-172.
{15}See Svitlana Kravchenko, “The Aarhus Convention and Innovations in Compliance with Multilateral Environmental Agreements”，18 Colo. J. Intl Envtl. L.＆Pol''y 1 (2007)，pp. 1-50.
{16}See Xinyuan Dai, International Institutions and National Policies, Cambridge University Press, 2007，pp. 61-66.
{17}See Id.，pp. 100-113.
{18}See Paul Wapner, “Politics Beyond the State： Environmental Activism and World Civic Politics”，47 World Pol. 311（1995)，pp. 311-340.
{19}See David Vogel, “The Private Regulation of Global Corporate Conduct”，in Walter Mattli and Ngaire Woods (eds.)，The Politics of Global Regulation, Princeton University Press, pp. 151-188； Jason Morrison and Naomi Roht-Arriaza, “Private and Quasi-Private Standard Setting”，in Daniel Bodansky, Jutta Brunn6e and Ellen Hey（eds.），supra note {7 }，pp. 498-527； Tim Blithe and Walter Mattli, The New Global Rulers： The Privatization of Regulation in the World Economy, Princeton University Press, 2011.
{20}See David Vogel, “Private Global Business Regulation”，11 Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 261 (2008)，pp. 262, 269.
{21}根据IS026000文本，这里的应该（should）是非强制意义的、非义务性质的，而非强制性的、义务性的（shall）。
{22}在概念上，这些私人规制工具被称为全球私人规制、跨国民间法、跨国软法、没有国家的全球法、跨国私法或者私人国际机制等。
{23}但在劳动力市场为买方市场的情况下，全球环境私人规制对于劳动者的感召力和对商业企业的威胁性都不会强。
{24}See KennethW. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, “Hard and Soft Law in International Governance”，54 Int l Org. 421 (2000)．
{25}See Anne-Marie Slaughter, supra note {7}，pp. 112-117； Jason Morrison and Naomi Roht-Amaza, supra note{19}，PP.512-520； Peter J. Spiro, supra note {7}，pp. 784-789.
{26}See Paul Wapner, supra note{18}，pp. 329-330.
{27}See Errol Meidinger, “The Administrative Law of Global Private-Public Regulation： the Case of Forestry”，17 Eur. J. Intl Law47 (2006).
{28}See Benjamin Cashore, Graeme Auld and Deanna Newsom, Governing through Markets： Forest Certification and the Emergence of Non-State Authority, Yale University Press, 2004； Id.，pp. 76-79.
{29} See Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, The New Sovereignty： Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements, Har-vard University Press, 1998. pp. 250-270.
