【作者简介】
缪因知，北京大学法学院06级博士研究生。
【注释】主要文献包括Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. Fin. 1131-50 (1997);  La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Law and Finance, 106 J. Pol. Econ. 1113-55 (1998) La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer, Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54 J. Fin. 471-517 (1999); La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny, Agency Problems and Dividend Policies Around the World, 158 J. Fin. 3-27 (2000); Simon Johnson, La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer, Tunneling, 90 Am. Econ. Rev. 22-27 (2000); Simeon Djankov, Edward Glaeser, La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer, The New Comparative Economics, 31 J. Comp. Econ. 595-619 (2003);  Edward Glaeser & Shleifer, Legal Origins, 117 Q. J. Econ. 1193-1229 (2002); Glaeser & Shleifer, The Rise of the Regulatory State, 41 J. Econ. Lit. 401-25 (2003); La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer, What Works in Securities Laws?, 61 Journal of Finance 1-32 (2006) ; La Porta, Djankov, Carelee McLiesh & Shleifer, Private Credit in 129 Countries, 84 J. Fin. 299-329 (2007); Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, The Law and Economics of Self-dealing, 88 J. Fin. Econ. 430-65 (2008).一个早期较完整的立场陈述，见La Porta et al., Investor Protection and Corporate Governance, 58 J. Fin. Econ. (2000). 对其观点的一个较新的重要小结和辩解，可见La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer , "The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins",46 Journal of Economic Literature 285(2008).中译文见《不同法律起源的经济后果》（上、下），李鹏飞、尹振东译，载吴敬琏主编：《比较》第36、37辑，中信出版社2008年版。
这些学者及其受启发者对于不同法系渊源造成的现实差别的研究还涉及劳动市场监管、政府对银行和媒体的所有权、征兵、司法程序的形式化程度等多个方面。如Juan Botero, Simeon Djankov, La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer, The Regulation of Labor, 119 Q. J. Econ. 1340-82 (2004).
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer , "The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins",285.
不仅其四人在经济学界被频频引用，法律研究者也由此对西方主要国家的股东权利保护重新进行了细致的考察，甚至重新编制了衡量公司法质量的指标。如Thoedor Baums & Keneth Scott, Taking Shareholder Protection Seriously? Corporate Governance in the United States and Germany, 53 American Journal of Comparative Law 31-75 (2005); Udo Braendle, Shareholder Protection in the USA and Germany: “Law and Finance” Revisited, 7 German Law Journal 257-278 (2006); Priya Lele & Mathias Siems, Shareholder Protection: A Leximetric Approach, 7 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 17-50 (2007). 波斯纳也赞誉LLSV是代表着法经济学发展方向的第四代学者。Richard Posner,  A Review of Steven Shavell''s Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law, 44 Journal of Economic Literature 405-414, p.411 (2006).
证明证券市场促进经济增长的文献较多，重要的包括Raymond Atje & Boyan Jovanovic, Stock Markets and Development, 37 Eur. Econ. Rev. 632 (1993) (发现股票市场流动性和经济增长之间呈正相关关系))。Asli Demirguc-Kunt & Vojislav Maksimovic, Law, Finance and Firm Growth, 53 J. Fin. 2107 (1998) (发现具有较为活跃的证券市场的国家的企业能够获取更多的资金来促进增长);  Ross Levine & Sara Zervos, Stock Markets, Banks, and Economic Growth, 88 Am. Econ. Rev. 537 (1998);  Maurice Obstfeld, Risk-Taking, Global Diversification and Growth, 84 Am. Econ. Rev. 1310 (1994) (发现投资者通过证券市场分散投资的能力促进了经济增长)。
John Coffee, Jr., The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and the State in the Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 Yale Law Journal 1-82 (2001), pp.12-14.
Katharina Pistor, Patterns of Legal Change: Shareholder and Creditor Rights in Transition Economies, 1 European Business Organization Law Review (2000)1: 59-110, or in Fox and Heller eds, Corporate Governance Lessons from Transition Economy Reforms, Princeton University Press 2006.
World Bank, Doing Business Report (various years),  available athttp://www.doingbusiness.org.
Mark Roe, Legal Origins, Politics And Modern Stock Markets, 120 Harv. Law Review 460 (2006), p.516.中译文见《法系渊源、政治和现代股票市场》，《北大法律评论》第九卷第二辑，北京大学出版社2008年版。
对其观点的一个较新的自我总结，可见La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer , "The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins",46 Journal of Economic Literature 285(2008), pp. 285-288.中译文见《不同法律起源的经济后果》（上），李鹏飞、尹振东译，载吴敬琏主编：《比较》第36辑，中信出版社2008年。
Lucian Bebchuk, A Rent-Protection Theory of Corporate Ownership and Control (Nat''l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7203, 1999), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/7203; Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance, 52 Stan. L. Rev. 127 (1999);其强调路径依赖造成股权已然集中的国家内，强大的要求维持现状的寻租力量。强调起始点和现存条件的影响的论文还可见Amir N. Licht, The Mother of All Path Dependencies: Toward a Cross-Cultural Theory of Corporate Governance Systems, 26 Del. J. Corp. L. 147 (2001).
John Coffee Jr., The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and the State in the Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 Yale L.J. 1(2001).
Mark Roe , Political Determinants of corporate governance, Oxford University Press, 2003. Mark Roe, Legal Origins, Politics And Modern Stock Markets, 120 Harv. Law Review 460 (2006).中译文见《法系渊源、政治和现代股票市场》，《北大法律评论》第九卷第二辑，北京大学出版社2008年版。
例如，LLSV的开山之作Law and Finance虽然受到了多重批判，作者本身的观点也有所变化和改进。但在其学术论敌Roe主编的一部较近的论文集中，该文再次被列入， 见Mark J. Roe ed, Corporate Governance: Political and Legal Perspectives, Oxford University Press 2005.
史晋川、栾天虹：《法与金融比较理论评述》，《中国社会科学评论》2003年第1期；郑长德、卞娜：《法和金融学：国外研究文献综述》，《西南民族大学学报（人文社科版）》2004年第8期；余保福：“法律、金融发展与经济增长——法律金融理论研究述评”，《财经理论与实践》2005年第4期；谈儒勇：“法与金融：文献综述及研究展望”，《上海财经大学学报》2005年第5期。
La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 Journal of Political Economy 1113-1155 (1998). 中译本见《法律与金融》，张鸣飞等译，载《经济导刊》2002年第1期、第2期。这篇文章实际上完成于1996年，是最早的“法与金融”论文。正式发表前的修订主要是改进了变量的选择，见p.1126, footnote 4.
张建伟：《比较法视野下的金融发展》，载《环球法律评论》2006年第5期。其之前的《法律、投资者保护与金融发展革》，《当代法学》2005年第5期，对该文献作了初步介绍。
李清池：《法律、金融与经济发展：比较法的量化进路及其检讨》，《比较法研究》2007年第6期。
郁光华、邵丽：《论LLSV法律来源论的缺陷性》，《光华法学》第二辑，西南财经大学出版社2007年版。但其的一些小标题如“对披露机制的政治经济解释”没有充分展开，对内地一些股市弊案的事实介绍也似乎篇幅过大。
限于篇幅，本文只讨论LLSV的股东权利指数。然其债权人权利指数的选取设置也存在着类似问题，如可见Katharina Pistor, Patterns of Legal Change: Shareholder and Creditor Rights in Transition Economies, in Fox and Heller eds, Corporate Governance Lessons from Transition Economy Reforms, Princeton University Press 2006, pp.52-53.
后来其还发展出了一些新的指标，如老股东在发行新股时的受保护程度，La Porta，Florencio Lopez –de-Silanes，Andrei Shleifer, What Works in Securities Laws?, 61 J. Fin. 1 (2006).中译本见《证券法中什么起作用》，载《比较》第23辑，吴飞、郭雳译，中信出版社2006年版。又如通过公司法确定的股东免受内部人自我交易的保护程度的指标。如Simeon Djankov, La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, The Law and Economics of Self-Dealing, (December 2005). NBER Working Paper  No. W11883,  http://ssrn.com/abstract=875734, p.28.
如Katharina Pistor, Patterns of Legal Change: Shareholder  and Creditor Rights in Transition Economies.
La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 Journal of Political Economy 1113 (1998),  pp. 1120-1121.
Ronald J. Gilson, Controlling Shareholders And Corporate Governance: Complicating The Comparative Taxonomy,119 Harv. L. Rev. 1641 (2006),p1645.详细的实证数据见Marco Becht & Colin Mayer, Introduction to The Control of Corporate Europe (Fabrizio Barca & Marco Becht eds., 2001); Stijn Claessens, Simeon Djankov & Larry H.P. Lang, The Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asian Corporations, 58 J. Fin. Econ. 81 (2000); Mara Faccio & Larry H.P. Lang, The Ultimate Ownership of Western European Corporations, 65 J. Fin. Econ. 365 (2002); Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54 J. Fin. 471 (1999).
Sofie Cools, The Real Difference in Corporate Law Between the United States and Continental Europe: Distribution of Powers, 30 Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 697-766 (2005).
Katharina Pistor, Patterns of Legal Change: Shareholder and Creditor Rights in Transition Economies, in Fox and Heller eds, Corporate Governance Lessons from Transition Economy Reforms, Princeton University Press 2006, p.37 .做出此项批评之余，Pistor在自己论文的指标体系中考察了相关转轨国家从1990-1998年之间的法律变化。
在其后来的研究中，LLSV做了一些改进，比如在变量上给出了1/3、2/3这样的数值或者是允许在0-10之间变化，如La Porta et al., "What Works in Securities Laws?", 61 J. Fin. 1 (2006),pp.6-10。
Bernard Black and John Coffee, Hail Brittania: Institutional Investor Behavior Under Limited Regulation,92 Mich. L. Rev. 1997 (1994).
La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 Journal of Political Economy 1113 (1998),  pp. 1145-1146.
公司法规则的分类见Melvin Avon Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporate Law, 89 Columbia Law Review 1461-1525 (1989). 中译本见《公司法的结构》，张开平译，载王保树主编：《商事法论集》第3卷，法律出版社1999年版，或汪辉敏、历镛译，徐菁校，《比较》第14辑，中信出版社2004年。
李清池：《法律、金融与经济发展:比较法的量化进路及其检讨》，《比较法研究》2007年第6期，页65。
Easterbrook & Fischel , The Economic Structure of Corporate Law, Harvard University Press. 1991, p15.中译本见《公司法的经济结构》，罗培新、张建伟译，北京大学出版社2005年版。
Frank Easterbrook, International Corporate Differences: Market or Law? Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 9 (4): pp23-29.
Bernard Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial? A Political and Economic Analysis,  84 Nw. U. L. Rev. 542 (1990). 认为和正式的法律约束相比，有效的资本市场、运转良好和竞争性的经理人市场与产品市场能对经理人权力更有效地约束。
La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 Journal of Political Economy 1113-1155 (1998),  p.1121. 不过对于这一问题LLSV在后续的研究中加以了明显纠正，见Simeon Djankov, La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, The Law and Economics of Self-Dealing, (December 2005). NBER Working Paper  No. W11883,  http://ssrn.com/abstract=875734, p.28.
La Porta et al., Law and Finance, p.1127.如Pistor所言，其中的绝大部分变量只是通过投票来行使的“发声权”(voice)，故她在自己构建的权利指标体系中加入了更多的东西。见Katharina Pistor, Patterns of Legal Change: Shareholder and Creditor Rights in Transition Economies, in Fox and Heller eds, Corporate Governance Lessons from Transition Economy Reforms, Princeton University Press 2006.
John Coffee, Jr., The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and the State in the Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 Yale L.J. 1(2001) ,Note 6.
参见Bernard Black, The Core Institutions that Support Strong Securities Markets, 55 Business Lawyer 1565-1607 (2000). Bernard Black, “The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities Markets”, 48 UCLA Law Review 781(2001),中译文可见《强大证券市场的法律和制度前提》，洪艳蓉译，北大金融法中心编：《金融法苑》第57期，法律出版社2004年。
Bernard Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial? A Political and Economic Analysis, 84 Nw. U. L. Rev. 542 (1990),p.565.
John C Coffee, Jr., Privatization and Corporate Governance: the Lesson form Securities market failure, p.270.
Katharina Pistor, Law as a Determinant for Equity Market Development: the Experience of Transition Economies, in Murell, Peter (ed.), The Value of Law in Transition Economies, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001: 249-287.中译文见《法律作为证券市场发展的决定性因素》，载《法律的价值》，韩光明译，法律出版社2006年版，该文通过比较波兰、捷克和匈牙利三国的法律规则与证券市场状况，得出上述结论。
La Porta et al., “What Works in Securities Laws?” , 61 J. Fin. 1 (2006),p.22.
La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 Journal of Political Economy 1113-1155 (1998) ,pp. 1147-1148.
Id,  pp. 1146.
Id,  pp. 1131.
李清池：《法律、金融与经济发展:比较法的量化进路及其检讨》，《比较法研究》2007年第6期，第66页。
Rainer Haselmann et al.,  “How Law Affects Lending”， Columbia Law & Economics Working Paper No. 285, 2006, http://ssrn.com/abstract=846665.
Katharina Pistor, Martin Raiser & Stanislaw Gelfer, Law and Finance in Transition Economies, 8 Economics of Transition 325-368 (2000).
Amir N. Licht,  Chanan Goldschmidt & Shalom H. Schwartz,  Culture, Law, and Corporate Governance, 25 International Review of Law & Economics 229-255 (2005).
Mark D. West, Legal Determinants of World Cup Success,  Michigan Law and Economics Research Paper No. 02-009, http://ssrn.com/abstract=318940 (2002).
Richard Posner,  A Review of Steven Shavell''s Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law, 44 Journal of Economic Literature (2006), p.411.
如John Coffee, Jr., The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and the State in the Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 Yale Law Journal (2001).
Edward L. Glaeser & Shleifer, Legal Origins, 117 Q.J. Econ. 1193  (2002), p.1222. La Porta et al., Investor Protection and Corporate Governance, 58 J. Fin. Econ. 3, p 9.(2000). La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. Fin. 1131 (1997). Djankov, Simeon, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, Courts, Q.J. Econ. 118: 453–518(2003). Johnson , Simon, Peter Boone, Alasdair Breach, and Eric Friedman. 2000. “Corporate Governance in the Asian Financial Crisis”. Journal of Financial Economics 58: 141–186.
La Porta et al., The Quality of Government, 15 J.L. Econ. & Org. 222  (1999). La Porta et al., Investor Protection and Corporate Governance, 58 J. Fin. Econ. 3  (2000).
John Coffee, "The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and the State in the Separation of Ownership and Control", 111 Yale L.J. 1(2001), p.10.
Id, pp. 24-39.
如Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1435, 1441 (1992). Mark Roe, Legal Origins, Politics And Modern Stock Markets, 120 Harv. Law Review 460 (2006) ,p. 472. William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 Yale L.J. 663, (1974),p.670, 672, 681-684.
Mark Roe, Legal Origins, Politics And Modern Stock Markets, 120 Harv. Law Review 460 (2006), p.473.
对此时期英国法的描述，见Brian R. Cheffins, The Separation of Ownership and Control in the United Kingdom, 30 Journal of Legal Studies 459-484 (2001).
North-West Transportation Co. v. Beatty, 12 App. Cas. 589 (P.C. 1887)
Paul L. Davies,  Gower''s Principles of Modern Company Law (6th ed. 1997), pp611-612.
Brian R. Cheffins, Does Law Matter? The Separation of Ownership and Control in the United Kingdom, 30 J. Legal Stud. 459 , 469-70 (2001).
John Coffee, Jr., “The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and the State in the Separation of Ownership and Control”, 111 Yale Law Journal (2001), pp.41-42.需要注意的是，与Cheffins 不同，Coffee认为由于英国的司法不像美国那么腐败，所以证券交易所自我规制的动力不大，所以也没那么大作用。
Frederick Schauer,  “The Failure of the Common Law,” 36 Ariz. St. L.J. (2004), p.765, 772. Basil S. Markesinis, “Learning from Europe and Learning in Europe”, in The Gradual Convergence 1, 30-32 (Basil S. Markesinis ed., 1994).
Paul Mahoney, “The Common Law and Economic Growth”, in Fox and Heller eds, Corporate Governance Lessons from Transition Economy Reforms, Princeton University Press 2006, p.85.
Carl Baudenbacher,  Some Remarks on the Method of Civil Law, 34 Tex. Int''l L.J. 333, pp.357-360 (1999).
Mark J. Roe, “Legal Origins, Politics And Modern Stock Markets”, 120 Harv. Law Review 460 (2006) ,pp.477-479.
Id ,pp.482-494. Jackson and Mark Roe, Public Enforcement of Securities Laws: Preliminary Evidence, http://fmg.lse.ac.uk/upload_file/760_H_Jackson.pdf.
缪因知：《论国家干预偏好对证券市场发展的影响：普通法与大陆法的一项差异》（未刊稿，2009）。
Robert Cooter and Tom Ginsburg, Comparative Judicial Discretion: An Empirical Test of Economic Models, 16 Int’l Rev. L. &Econ. 295  (1996).
参见Bernard S. Black & John C. Coffee, Jr., Hail Britannia? Institutional Investor Behavior Under Limited Regulation, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 1997, 2002-05 (1994)John Coffee, Privatization and Corporate Governance: the Lesson form securities market failure, in Fox and Heller eds, Corporate Governance Lessons from Transition Economy Reforms, Princeton University Press 2006, pp.269-271.
John Coffee, "The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and the State in the Separation of Ownership and Control", 111 Yale L.J. 1(2001), p.18.Coffee认为其中的关键在于公法因素，即荷兰和英国一样，是一个开放、多元主义和分权化的社会，没有一个主动性的中央官僚机构来对重要的经济自发活动施加限制，Id, pp.61-62. 又可见John C. Coffee, Jr. Law And The Market: The Impact Of Enforcement 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 229 (2007), p.251
Mark Roe, Legal Origins, Politics And Modern Stock Markets, 120 Harv. Law Review 460 (2006) ,p.488, 496.
Alexander Aganin and Paolo Volpin, “History of Corporate Ownership in Italy”, in Randall K. Morck, eds, A History of Corporate Governance around the World: Family Business Groups to Professional Managers, University of Chicago Press,2005.
John Coffee, The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and the State in the Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 Yale L.J. 1(2001).p.12.
Id, pp.12-21.
Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, The Great Reversals: The Politics of Financial Development in the 20th Century, 69Journal of Financial Economics 5 （2003）.
John Armour, Simon Deakin, Prabirjit Sarkar, Mathias Siems and Ajit Singh, “Shareholder Protection and Stock Market Development: An Empirical Test of the Legal Origins Hypothesis” (2007) at 27-28; 载 http://ssrn.com/abstract=998329.
La Porta et al., “Law and Finance”, 106 Journal of Political Economy 1113 (1998), p. 1130, 1142.
Id,, p. 1150.
Id,, p. 1147.
郁光华、邵丽：《论LLSV法律来源论的缺陷性》，载《光华法学》第二辑，第26页。
这些例子可见La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer , "The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins",298-299.
Katharina Pistor, Yoram Keinan, Jan Kleinheisterkamp and Mark West, "Legal Evolution and the Transplant Effect", World Bank Research Observer (2003) 18 (1): 89-112.中译文见《法律演进与移植效果：六个法律移植国家中公司法发展的经验》，《比较》第2辑，中信出版社2003年版。
Kenneth W. Dam, The Law-Growth Nexus: The Rule of Law and Economic Development 38-39 (2006).
La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. Pol. Econ. 1113  (1998). Berkowitz, Pistor, Richard, Economic Development, Legality and the Transplant Effect, 47 European Economic Review 165 (2002).
Zweigert & Hein Kotz, An Introduction to Comparative Law. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998, pp.109-113.
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer , "The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins",46 Journal of Economic Literature 285(2008), p.304.
John Henry Merryman, The French deviation, The American Journal of Comparative Law, 44(1) (1996),pp.109-119. Berkowitz, Pistor, Richard, Economic Development, legality and the transplant effect, 47 European Economic Review, 165,(2002).
Zweigert & Hein Kotz, An Introduction to Comparative Law. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998, pp.225-229.
Dawson, John P, The Oracles of the Law. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Law School, 1968, (Reprinted in 1986 by William S. Hein & Co., Inc. Buffalo, New York).
John Henry Merryman,. 1996. The French deviation, The American Journal of Comparative Law, 44(1): p.116.
Thorsten Beck & Ross Levine, Legal Institutions And Financial Development,  http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/
2003/10/06/000160016_20031006122849/Rendered/PDF/wps3136.pdf>, pp.12-13.
Thorsten Beck, Asli Demirguc-kunt & Ross Levine, Law and Finance: Why Does Legal Origin Matter?, 31 Journal of Comparative Economics 653-75 (2003).
Katharina Pistor, Martin Raiser & Stanislaw Gelfer,  “Law and Finance in Transition Economies”, 8 Economics of Transition 325-368 (2000).
Berkowitz, Pistor, Richard,  “Economic Development, Legality and the transplant effect”, 47 European Economic Review 165 (2002).
如其他学者的实证研究表明在对政治环境特征指标和资源禀赋进行控制后，法系渊源可以很好地解释国别金融市场发展的差异，Beck,Thorsten, Asli Demirguc-Kunt, Ross Levine, Law, Endowments and Finance, 70 Journ. of Finan. Econ., (2003) pp.137-181。在对文化宗教因素进行控制后，也是如此。见Stulz and Williamson, Culture, Openness and Finance, 70 Journ. of Finan. Econ.,(2003), pp.313-349.
Bernard Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities Markets”, 48 UCLA Law Review 781(2001), pp 846-847.
Steven Kaplan, Top Executive Rewards and Firm Performance: A Comparison of Japan and the U.S., 102 J. Pol. Econ. 510 (1994);Steven Kaplan, Top Executive Turnover and Firm Performance in Germany, 10J.L. Econ & Org. 142 (1994).
资本市场发展中的功能趋同的一般理论可见John Coffee, Jr., The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and Its Implications, 93 Nw. U. L. Rev. 641 (1999).Ronald J. Gilson, Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or Function, 49 Am. J. Comp. L. (2001),
鹤光太郎：《用内生性法律理论研究法律制度与经济体系》，綦明、李琳译，《比较》第8辑，中信出版社2003年版，第126页。
对于中国推进证券市场建设可以考虑的四项法律路径的效用分析，见缪因知：《中国证券市场建设之若干法律路径的效用分析》，《经济法学家（2007年卷）》，北京大学出版社2008年。

第 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 页 共[6]页