1 Theoretical tests thereto
(i) Interest of justice as an accessory test
It was a general approach adopted in the past by judges. As the argument advanced by scholars, ''it suffers from the defect of being inherently vague and providing to neither courts nor those engaged in business any clear guidance''[3].
Vagueness itself determines the referencing and transitional fate of the approach. It is difficult to find more than simply a reference to other grounds even in the dicta adopting the test: ''this could be done in the interests of justice irrespective of the legal efficacy of the corporate structure provided he either substantially or effectively controlled the company concerned. The network of companies had been set up in an attempt to confuse and conceal.''[4] As for me, the reasoning on the ground of facade to confuse and conceal, despite using the name of interest of justice, is just a supporting evidence for the Woolfson rule below. The interest of justice approach was also applied in Creasey v Breachwood Motors Ltd [1993]. In order for the piercing, the court had to distinguish the decision in Adams v Cape Industries plc where the court refused to pierce the veils of companies in a group. The judge, in the name of interest of justice by the wording that ''to achieve justice where its exercise is necessary for that purpose'', held that the cause of action had not accrued in the Adams case whereas it had done so in the present case.
It is submitted that interest of justice test, which had been and will be an important element and guiding reference at the court''s discretion, cannot be regarded as an independent test without the support from other tests and facts for its defects. Therefore, the author will leave it alone in the list of practical applications below, which never means it is meaningless: just the opposite, many wordings in precedents using ''justice so requires'', even though a different test had been applied, reflected that ''interest of justice'', in spite of its adherent (to other tests) status, did influence the decision at all times.
(ii) Failure of single economic unit argument
It was argued that companies in a group, under appropriate circumstances, should be treated as a single economic unit. It has been supported by the precedent DHN Food Distributors Ltd v Tower Hamlets London Borough Council [1976] where the veil of DHN and its wholly-owned subsidiary had been lifted. Indeed, creditors or other third parties to a subsidiary may be disadvantaged as a result of that company''s position in the company group.
