From the functionalism point of view, among all social orders constructed past, the constitutional order is the least bad order form. Firstly, the sovereignty and the operation of state power are affirmed and regulated through constitutional approaches, so as to provide fundamental support to the state regime and to maintain the stable regime. The operation mechanism, to reasonably allocate the state power by constitutional rules, can realize the legal power transition and normative power operation, and can effectively preclude unstable factors existing in the regime, so the whole regime is sustained and orderly, and the authoritative distribution of values can be realized. [44] In fact, no orderly society can be realized without authority. What the constitutionalists need to guard against is only those absolute authorities which have no restraint. Secondly, the constitutional government provides the political subjects with a complete set of basic constitutive rules and rules of order, to control the political struggle within the existing constitutional framework in accordance with the standardized procedures, so as to prevent the political crisis from aggravating. Actually, it plays a role of solving political conflicts and eliminating political contradictions; Also, in modern societies, when the constitutional government builds the framework of liberal politics, it also provides all necessary and imperative rights guarantee for the operation of governmental powers. It is conducive for ensuring the political subjects to orderly participate in various political activities and fully express their demands for interests, within the established institutional framework, so that the whole social regime can always be orderly and operated soundly. It can also encourage people to take every positive action to deal with various political disputes and eliminate conflicts through various positive and orderly constitutional actions; Moreover, the constitutional government can also provide a reasonable pattern for distribution of diverse political interests so as to maintain a relatively liberal social order; At last, the tolerant constitutional government can effectively prevent the society from ideological autocracy prevent the masses from following blindly, and stop the emerging of obscurant awareness, so that the societies can be held in a rational path. At the same time, the constitutional consensus will make people develop independent cognition and emotion on their respective regime, so the different ideologies can be integrated and coexisted within an institutional framework acceptable to all to maintain stability and applicability of politics. [45] It can be seen that: in countries which carried out constitutional system at earlier stage, even though the tradition of politics and law is different, and constitutional development modes show different features, these countries generally maintained political stability and relatively orderly constitutional pattern. After the Second World War, with the publication of the "Universal Convention on Human Rights" and other international conventions of human rights, it undoubtedly marked that the constitutional consensus has been further reached among countries, which speeded up the constitutional reforms. Since then, there was no more human rights disaster like the Second World War broke out again. Even in those developing countries which are currently stepping forward totteringly along an unsmooth road of constitutional government, because of the functions of their constitutional theory and relevant systems, they also maintain a dynamic and orderly political development momentum. In a word, the constitutional government is an inevitable tendency and advanced status of the development of human political civilization, the reflection of supreme rationality of human, and the primary goal of countries which are currently carrying forward regime reform. Undoubtedly, the constitutional order is the most ideal social objective and development status for maintaining political order through measures of the rule of law.
Any reform is definitely to break the old system and establish a new one. The constitutional reform is not an exception. Firstly, the constitutional stability does not mean the absolute status of rest and rigidity, but a dynamically stable status. From the development point of view, the constitutional stability means that, the existing regimes are operated and developed under the relevant regulatory mechanisms. Therefore, the achievement of the constitutional order may cause the political fluctuations in modern countries, within certain period and certain limits. And this is bound to cause people''s psychological fluctuations, within certain period and certain limits. So, the achievement of the constitutional order relies on the people''s cognitive abilities and levels of constitutional government. Without people''s mutual and conscious constitutional awareness, the constitutional order cannot be achieved; Secondly, though the constitutional order reflects an orderly operation of rights and power, because of the "equal-right" political relationship of internal structure of constitutional system, the activities of power characters are always idiosyncratic. If let it be, it could go to extremes. In that case, we will never achieve the constitutional goal. In addition, because it violates the constitutional principles, the human liberty will be restrained or damaged; Thirdly, the external factors which prevent the achievement of constitutional order, especially those occasional and uncontrollable ones, will directly influence the progress and the speed of constitutional order construction. From the worldwide point of view, even if constitutional movements have hundreds years of history, there are many countries only having the outer show of the constitution, but no concrete substance or foundation for constructing the constitutional order. For example, Iraq and Afghanistan currently are facing lots of problems after they copied the western constitutional mode. Russia turned to the track of western democracy after the collapse of former Soviet, but it has not realized the ideal constitutional order yet. Also, as the systematic foundation of the constitutional order, the constitution sees its own limits. For example, the norm of legislation relies too much on the principles, with too large extension margin. It gives too much uncertainty to the norm of the constitution, and in these uncertain situations, the law executors will have more options, and they may take advantages of it to weasel out on purpose. From the point of view of constitutional provisions, because these provisions are too sketchy and too abstract to bring many loopholes to law enforcement, so the law executors are prone to make arbitrary decisions, leaving the constitution there as a book. In addition, compared with the legislation norm of other laws, the design of constitutional norm of all countries are generally partial to the behavior pattern. In many cases, the implementation of the constitutional sanction has to rely on the ordinary law. That is exactly why there are few representative cases of constitutional sanction, and these cases have strong politic natures. In this way, the normalization and authority of constitution are greatly lowered; besides, the institutional identifications and provisions are generally more than the implement provisions in all countries'' constitutional norms. It always makes the constitution have no provisional support for supervision and guarantee, so the constitution becomes a mere formality. And, from the point of view of objects and contents, in lots of countries'' constitutions, there are few regulations to limit the actions of the governing party. In general circumstances, the management of the actions of the governing party just relies on the internal regulations and general practices of the party. But these internal regulations are neither forceful enough nor binding as the constitution and law, giving rise to loopholes between the constitution and the legal responsibilities. Therefore, "once the governing party abuses the constitutional organizations and intervention rights, the constitutional government will definitely be out of control" [46] and so on. From this point of view, the turbulence and the crisis are inevitable during the current constitutional reform, and the prices countries have to pay to promote constitutional movements.
