当下中国的公司治理模式和对董事会制度意识的淡薄，毫无疑问受制于儒家法律传统中缺乏合议、共管、投票决策的知识，受制于现行体制下国有企业和家族企业构成主体的现实，受制于资本市场受到规制并被分割的规制模式，受制于在法学知识上倾向于股东会中心主义的思维习惯。但随着公司组织在今天的社会现实中的进化，重新认识董事会制度及其背后的深层逻辑，“认真对待”公司的政治属性，在董事会权威中心、合议和共管制度上继续不断学习，也许是我们的必然选择。

【作者简介】
邓峰，单位为北京大学法学院。
【注释】参见John P. Davis,Corporations: A Study of the Origin and Development of Great Business Combina-tions and of Their Relation to the Authority of State, vol. 1, New York: G. P. Putnam s Sons, 1905,pp. 13-34.
Douglas M. Branson,Corporate Governance, Charlottesville, VA: Michie Company, 1993, pp. 153-157.
特拉华州普通公司法§228条。参见Edward P. Welch and Andrew J. Turezyn,Folk on the DelawareGeneral Corporation Law: Fundamentals, Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1993, pp. 510-515.
参见Melvin Aron Eisenberg,Corporations and Other Business Organizations, 8thedition, New York:Foundation Press, 2000, pp. 180-181.
参见Stephen M. Bainbridge,Corporation Law and Economics, New York: Foundation Press, 2002, pp.450-452.
Rufus J. Baldwin and another v. Thomas H. Canfield, 26 Minn. 43,1 N.W. 261; 1879 Minn.
May v. Bigmar, Inc., 838 A.2d. 285, 288 n.8 (Del. Ch. 2003).
Stephen M. Bainbridge,The New Corporate Governance in Theory and Practice, New York: Oxford U-niversity Press, 2008, p. 82.
参见Mads Andenas and Frank Wooldridge,European Comparative Company Law, Cambridge: Cam-bridge University Press, 2009,pp. 288,291,308.德国明确允许公司章程作出例外规定,但个体决策不能对抗多数决策。
参见Lawrence E. Mitchell, Fairness and Trust in Corporate Law,"Duke Law Journal, vol. 43, no. 3(Dec. 1993), pp. 425-491.这里所说的合同法和行政法,只是一般规范意义上的,在理论上也存在着争议,包括合同法中的对价理论和行政法中的公平要求。参见Larry A. DiMatteo,Contract Theory: TheEvolution of Contractual Intent, East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1998;也可参见H. W.R. Wade and C. F. Forsyth,Administrative Law, 7thedition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994,p.44.
参见Oliver Williamson, Corporate Governance,"Yale Law Journal, vol. 93, no. 7 (Jun. 1984), pp.1197-1230.
参见Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Legal Role of Shareholders and Management in Modern Corporate Deci-sion-making,"California Law Review, vol. 57, no. 1 (Jan. 1969), pp. 10-14.
参见Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Legal Models of Management Structure in the Modern Corporation: Of-ficers, Directors, and Accountants,"CaliforniaLaw Review, vol. 63, no. 2 (Mar. 1975), pp. 375-439.
参见James D. Cox and Thomas Lee Hazen,Cox & Hazen on Corporations: Including UnincorporatedForms of Doing Business, 2ndEdition, vol. 1, New York: Aspen Publishers, 2003, p. 409.
参见Benjamin A. Streeter, III, Co-Determination in West Germany-Through the Best (and Worst) ofTimes,"Chicago-Kent Law Review, vol. 58, no. 3, 1982, pp. 982-983.
参见Lynne L. Dallas, The Relational Board: Three Theories of Corporate Boards of Directors,"Journalof Corporation Law, vol. 22, no. 1 (Fall 1996), pp. 1-25.
参见Lynne L. Dallas, The Multiple Roles of Corporate Boards of Directors,"San Diego Law Review,vol. 40, no. 3 (Fall 2003), pp. 781-820.
参见Oliver Hart, An Economist s View of Fiduciary Duty,"University of Toronto Law Journal, vol.43, no. 3 (Summer 1993), pp. 299-313,305-309.
参见Oliver E. Williamson, Corporate Boards of Directors: In Principle and in Practice,"Journal of
  Law, Economics, and Organization, vol. 24, no. 2 (Oct. 2008), pp. 247-272.
参见Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment,"Harvard Law Re-view, vol. 119, no. 6 (Apr. 2006), pp. 1735-1758.
参见Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group Decisionmaking in Corporate Governance,"Vander-bilt Law Review, vol. 55 (Nov. 2002), pp. 1-55.
参见Stephen M. Bainbridge,The New Corporate Governance in Theory and Practice, pp. 89-100.
参见Stephen M. Bainbridge,The New Corporate Governance in Theory and Practice, pp. 80-82.
参见Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Historical and Political Origins of the Corporate Board of Directors,"Hofstra Law Review, vol. 33, no. 1 (Fall2004), p. 108.对Gevurtz的公司历史起源的文章,国内学者有过介绍。参见吴伟央:《董事会职能流变考》,《中国政法大学学报》2009年第2期。
参见Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Historical and Political Origins of the Corporate Board of Directors,"p.109.
参见Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Historical and Political Origins of the Corporate Board of Directors," pp.110-111.
参见Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Historical and Political Origins of the Corporate Board of Directors,"p.116.
参见Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Historical and Political Origins of the Corporate Board of Directors,"p.129.
组织发展是按照已有的知识结构自我复制扩张的,这是组织理论和演化经济学理论中新发展出来的一种解释。参见Barbara Levitt and James G. March, Organizational Learning,"Annual Review of Sociol-ogy, vol. 14, 1988, pp. 319-340.也可参见Geoffrey M. Hodgson and Thorbjorn Knudsen, The Firmas an Interactor: Firms as Vehicles for Habits and Routines,"Journal of Evolutionary Economics, vol.14, 2004, pp. 281-307.
参见Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Historical and Political Origins of the Corporate Board of Directors,"p.129.
Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Historical and Political Origins of the Corporate Board of Directors,"p. 131.
Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Historical and Political Origins of the Corporate Board of Directors,"p. 162.
Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Historical and Political Origins of the Corporate Board of Directors," p. 134.
参见Franklin A. Gevurtz, The European Origins and Spread of the Corporate Board of Directors,"Stetson Law Review, vol. 33, no. 3 (Spring 2004), pp. 925-954.
参见Avner Greif, Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and Theoretical Reflec-tion on the Collective and Individualist Societies,"Journal of Political Economy, vol. 102, no. 5 (Oct.1994), pp. 912-950;也可参见Avner Grieif,Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessonfrom Medieval Trade, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
参见Timur Kuran, The Absence of the Corporation in Islamic Law: Origins and Persistence,"AmericanJournal of Comparative Law, vol. 53, no. 4 (Fall 2005), pp. 785-834.
参见Franklin A. Gevurtz, The European Origins and Spread of the Corporate Board of Directors," pp.931-934.
爱汉者等编:《东西洋考每月统计簿》,黄时鉴整理,北京:中华书局, 1997年,第418—420页。爱汉者是德国籍传教士郭实腊(Karl Friedrich Gutzlaff)的笔名,杂志由中国益智会举办。参见黄时鉴导言。
许多经济史学者注意到了这一问题,并且将其与中国面临的亟需富国强兵的观念、官办企业的方式等联系在一起。参见豆建民:《中国公司制思想研究》,上海:上海财经大学出版社, 1999年;杨在军:《晚清公司与公司治理》,北京:商务印书馆, 2006年。
《中国近代史资料汇编·海防档·甲·购买船炮》下册(共三册),台北:“中央研究院”近代史研究所, 1957年,第873—875页。
《中国近代史资料汇编·海防档·甲·购买船炮》下册,第921页。
聂宝璋:《中国近代航运史资料》第1辑,上海:上海人民出版社, 1983年,下册,第846—847页。
参见朱荫贵:《从大生纱厂看中国早期股份制企业的特点》,《中国经济史研究》2001年第3期;同时参见李玉:《中国近代股票的债券性———再论“官利”制度》,《南京大学学报》2003年第3期。
这方面的研究众多,例如杨勇:《近代中国公司治理:思想演变与制度变迁》,上海:上海人民出版社,2007年。
钟天纬:《轮船电报二事应如何剔弊方能持久策》,陈忠倚辑:《皇朝经世文三编》卷26,户政三,理财下。
《郑观应集》上册,上海:上海人民出版社, 1988年,第612页。
亚当·斯密:《原富》,严复译,北京:商务印书馆, 1981年,第115—116页,“严复案语”。
孟德斯鸠:《法意》,严复译,北京:商务印书馆, 1981年,第440页,“严复案语”。
此处所引《公司律》,均源于《大清新法律汇编》,杭州:麟章书局, 1910年再版,第551—580页。
参见Mark M. Hager, Bodies Politic: The Progressive History of Organizational Real Entity Theory,"University of Pittsburgh Law Review, vol. 50, 1989, pp. 575-654.
参见Stephen Bottomley,The Constitutional Corporation: Rethinking Corporate Governance, Aldershot:Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2007.
参见William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation,"Cardozo Law Re-view, vol.14 (Nov. 1992), pp.261-280.

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