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For active and future mining operations, it is necessary to integrate a reclamation plan coupled with a reclamation deposit into licensing process as the cases of Ghana and Philippines. For existing mines, a bond might be collected on a per-ton basis or through total sales value based deduction; while for future projects, a bond should be conditioned and posted in the application for the mining license. The size or amount has to be calculated properly and reasonably by the relevant authority, ensuring that it is adequate to recover the existing damages as well as costs for long-term care (e.g. where acid drainage exists); and, at the same time, that it is not so large so as to discourage potential investment (Intarapravich and Clark, 1994; Miller, 2000). An optimal solution would be to require a graduated, incremental and adjustable amount without requiring a large financial deposit at one time (Miller, 2000).[17] The bonds can be paid either by cash refundable with interest, financial guarantees such as certificates of deposit, government bonds, irrevocable letters of credit, and other liquid assets, or by a guarantee by an institution a bank, a financial institution or an insurance company (Intarapravich and Clark, 1994). The refund of posted bonds has to be well designed according to prescribed terms of time, standards and percentages. The key point within such a solution that needs to be addressed is that mine sites of various sizes including local or private mines should all be subjected to varying percentages of posted ponds.[18]
It is important that Argentine’s phase-based requirement for EIA and China’s requirement for Three Simultaneous Regulations be clearly laid down in mining regulations for prospective mining projects. The merits of these initiatives lie not only in governments’ decisions on the appropriateness of potential mining projects, but also in the encouragement of the mining sector to conduct ‘best practice’ in order to get the deposit refunded. By so doing, “a progressive reclamation, long-term monitoring and aftercare” may also be guaranteed,[19] and meanwhile reduced costs for reclamation for both governments and mining companies could be anticipated.
5.2. Strengthening of institutional coordination and effectiveness
“Environmental soundness does not only depend upon effective regulations and technical methods but also institutional context” (Warhurst, 1999). Mine land reclamation is such a comprehensive project that it requires a coherent regulatory regime as well as effective co-operation between all parties involved. Therefore, what is necessary is to create a consolidated and fully authoritative institution capable of “channelling information and criteria from both mining and environmental perspectives” (Walde, 1993), and mediating and balancing various interests. In China a possible approach is to legitimately empower the SEPA as the lead authority responsible for the overall reclamation work. A special reclamation office composed by representatives from the MLR, from the ministries of agriculture, and forestry, from the mining industries, from technical institutions and from local communities may act as a ‘one-stop shop’ for all regulation, administration and services for reclamation activity. An institutionalized decision-making process is proposed where the main issues—economic development versus environmental cost, that is to say, the authorities of both ministerial agencies and environmental agencies – are fully presented and balanced towards the most cost-effective mitigation measures (Walde, 1993). Directly subordinate to the national special office would lie sub-national offices comprised of representatives from relevant local sectors to enhance cooperation and mediation between different levels of government. In operation, the separation of regulatory units from the units that manage and allocate public land is advantageous in that they can monitor compliance with laws and take enforcement actions against violators without considering the importance of players in the economic life, results of economic activities, government revenue and the growth of jobs; thus internal conflicts of interests are reduced to the minimum (ADB, 2000). Such an initiative would require a strong commitment from government and adequate human, financial and judicial backups to the SEPA.
A further step is to clearly define responsibilities between national and sub-national level authorities. The scope of tasks to each level has to be agreed upon and regulated (Andrews-Speed et al., 2000). Some lessons of this allocation could be learnt from such countries as the US, the UK, Canada and Australia, where the national-level government is responsible for a unified national standard, while provincial or regional authorities are given more say on their decisions in line with their own situations. However, the national level agencies retain the power of oversight. Recent years have seen China take steps towards decentralisation in which certain powers have been devolved to the provinces. For example, state-owned coal mines once wholly controlled by the central government have all been returned to the provincial jurisdiction of relevant Bureaus of Land and Resources (BLRs). But some experts have complained about the current under-regulated and understaffed situation owing to the abolishment of the Ministry of Coal and the creation of MLR and its sub-level BLRs.[20] An alternative approach is to establish special offices directly subordinate to the national-level agencies to overcome this shortcoming, and to enhance coordination. Entrusted with everyday managerial tasks, the offices could easily collect information, make site-specific analyses and relevant decisions and sub-regulations, and monitor compliance in accordance with national standards. The result of such a reallocation of responsibilities would be that each level of authority is in its proper place and in a position to manage its own affairs with a minimum of over-regulation, duplication or under-regulation.
6. Conclusions
The aim of this article has been to present an overview of mine land reclamation in developing countries. Fully conscious of the contaminated land problem, developing countries have responded to the urgent need to address this issue in a unique way, primarily due to their political, economic, financial and technological constraints. The article has mainly focused on the regulatory perspectives of mine land reclamation with China as a case study. Although the regulatory frameworks vary, developing countries are characterised by contradictory objectives, segmented and general legislation, by complicated and confused institutional structures with low effectiveness, and by poor compliance. In essence, all these weaknesses derive from a dilemma between the priority of economic development and that of sustainable development. The costs of eradicating negative environmental impacts of mining are undoubtedly economically challenging for developing countries, but, in the long run, these costs will definitely be recouped from improved and sustained mining operations.
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