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There is another important issue with regard to the scope of banking business. While the bigger the scope is, the more chances the profits will be gained, the more risk will occur. Currently, China still implements business by division of occupation. As for the tendency of international banking from separation to harmonization, China should pay great attention on it.
Banking supervisory regulations are also incompatible with WTO national treatment principle. Domestic and foreign financial institutions have been strictly distinguished. Current regulations are very administrative and flexible on national treatment principle.
3. Lack of perfect mechanism for withdrawal from the market
The law of PRC on Commercial Banks regulates particularly on this kind of supervision in Chapter VII “take-over and termination”, but it is too simple on its supervision of withdrawal from the market due to bankruptcy or voluntary withdrawal by only four principle of regulations. There is no regulation on redemption of debt, recombination, effective capital take-over, trusteeship of closed banks. Additionally, banks are different from normal enterprises, its bankruptcy may erect a series of social problems. Therefore, supervision should be set up for the whole lot of the bankruptcy procedure. The authorities should take tough measures to establish the market withdrawal mechanism and to create a portfolio investment environment.
Measures to perfect the banking supervisory regulations system
1. To perfect the on-site examination in China
Building of the on-site examination is urgent, procedures of screening and protection of the power of inspection are the core of the system, It can draw on the experience of the United States, granting regulators the absolute right to inspect without advance notice, and once a bank is checked, Inspection Administration will have control of all information and property of the bank, to avoid intervention forces hampering the inspection process. Meanwhile, the law should also strengthen the responsibility of the inspectors.
The banking regulatory authority may take the following measures to conduct on-site examination for the purpose of exercising prudential supervision: (1) to enter a banking institution for on-site examination; (2) to interview the staff of the banking institution and require them to provide explanations on examined matters; (3) to have full access to and make copies of the banking institution’s documents and materials related to the on-site examination, and to seal up documents and materials that are likely to be removed, concealed or destroyed; and (4) to examine the banking institution’s information technology infrastructure for business operations and management.
2. To perfect the offsite surveillance in China
A critical part of the offsite process is the analytical skills of the individual financial analysts requested to make judgments regarding the bank’s financial condition. It follows that credible systems have to be complemented by skilled and trained financial analysts, and China’s unique economic and social factors will invariably help shape its offsite surveillance practices.
The Law of the People’s Republic of China on Banking Regulation and Supervision stipulates that the banking regulatory authority shall conduct off-site surveillance of the business operations and risk profile of banking institutions. For this purpose, it shall establish a supervisory information system to analyze and assess the risk profile of banking institutions.
Development of an offsite system carries the promise that the periodical financial reports currently generated by the banks could be used even more efficiently to generate an early warning system, using, for example, peer group analysis to detect broad trends affecting the financial sector. Implementing an effective offsite system in China requires overcoming some obvious, though surmountable, impediments. Just the vastness of our nation presents a major obstacle. Also, in China, the headquarters of the state-owned banks have traditionally delegated control to the local branches. The strong tradition of local autonomy has impeded comprehensive consolidated risk management systems, preparing timely consolidated financial statements and generating comprehensive supervisory reports.
Chinese banks are hindered by the information collection and dissemination systems for timely internal risk control analysis. Chinese banks are aware of the need to modernize the banking technology, including setting up a modern information system with real-time risk monitoring. Although the impetus for developing internal risk management can come from prescribed regulatory reporting requirements, the end result can be a banking system with more sophisticated risk management tools.
Up-to-date, after the operation testing in 2006, the national off-site surveillance information system for China’s banking industry officially started operating, which is a great reform in the history of China’s supervisory methods .
3. Credit Information System
In order to be successful, a Credit Information Bureau should adhere to several principles. First, clear and transparent rules governing the management of the Bureau, collection of information and the procedures for sharing it with the banking community. Second, the bureau should cooperate with the banking industry and address explicitly up-front the banking industry’s concerns. Enhancing the transparency of credit exposure (including contingent liabilities), collateral and delinquencies of borrowers through a Bureau is highly desirable in China.
When a banking institution is experiencing or likely to experience a credit crisis, thereby seriously jeopardizing the interests of depositors and other customers, the banking regulatory authority under the State Council may take over the banking institution or facilitate a restructuring. The take-over or restructuring shall be carried out in accordance with applicable laws and administrative regulations.
4. Isolation from non-bank activity risks
The US authorities have adopted the holding company framework as a solution to non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs) activities. The governing principle is that non-bank activities and affiliations should not take place through subsidiaries of banks. The U.S. regulatory framework requires that organizations that conduct financial business should organize in a holding company form where the bank and the other activities are subsidiaries of the holding company. The holding company is subject to capital adequacy and other prudential norms. Profits and losses of the business lines accrue to the holding company and thus do not directly endanger the bank, nor the deposit insurance system. One major advantage is that any losses in an affiliate do not flow to the bank, as in the case of direct subsidiaries of banks, where the risk is not isolated and can be transmitted to the parent.
Banks, in the presence of explicit deposit insurance such as in the US, or implicit deposit insurance such as in China, have an economic advantage in the form of lower funding costs. This advantage is not directly available to the non-depository affiliates. Such a situation undermines the competitive playing field between bank subsidiaries and independent firms engaging in the same business, defying the purpose of competition in financial services. Therefore, a policy objective of creating a level playing field, while at the same time preserving the integrity of the deposit insurance system, leads to segregation, regulation and supervision of non-bank activity. No matter what mode China elects to isolate banks from non-bank activity risks, the challenge for Chinese policy-makers will anticipate the inevitable and fast-paced transformation now under way in financial services and to update he regulatory and supervisory framework to respond to innovative markets.
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