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婵犵數鍋涢ˇ鏉棵洪弽顐n偨闁靛濡囬埞宥夋煃閳轰礁鏆曠紒鎲嬫嫹 | 婵犵數鍋涢ˇ鏉棵洪弽顐n偨闁靛鏅涘Λ妯好归悡搴f憼妞わ讣鎷� | 婵犵鍓濋〃鍛存偋閸涱垱顐介柨鐕傛嫹 | 缂傚倷绶¢崰妤呭磿閹惰棄绠圭憸鏂款嚕椤掑嫬鐐婇柍鍝勫暙婵烇拷 | 闂備礁鎲$敮妤呭垂瀹曞洩濮抽柕濞垮劗閺嬫牠鏌¢崶鈺佷户濞寸》鎷� | 婵犳鍠楄摫闁搞劌纾懞閬嶅Ω閵夈垺鐏冮梺鍝勬川閸嬬喐瀵奸敓锟� | 缂傚倸鍊风粈浣烘崲閹寸姷鐭堥柣鐔稿閺嬫牠鏌¢崶鈺佷户濞寸》鎷� | 闂佽崵鍋炵粙鎴﹀嫉椤掑嫬妫橀柛灞惧焹閺嬫牠鏌¢崶鈺佷户濞寸》鎷� | 闂佽崵濮村ú銈壦囬幎绛嬫晩闁圭偓鏋奸弸鏍煛閸モ晛浠уù纭锋嫹 | 闂備礁鎲¢懝楣冩偋閸曨垰鐒垫い鎴f娴滈箖姊洪棃娑欘棏闁稿鎹囬弻娑橆潩閻愵剙顏� | 婵犵鍓濋〃鍛存偋閸涱垱顐介柕澹啫鐏婃俊銈忕到閸熺娀宕戦幘缁樻櫢闁跨噦鎷� | 婵犵數鍋涢ˇ鏉棵洪弽顐n偨闁靛鏅涘Λ姗€鏌涢妷顖滅暠濠殿噯鎷� | 闂備礁鎲¢懝楣冩偋閸℃稑绠栭柟鍓х帛閸ゆ垿鏌涢幇銊︽珕闁瑰嚖鎷� | 婵犵數鍋涢ˇ鏉棵洪弽顐n偨闁靛/鍕濠殿喗绻傞惉鐓幬i敓锟� | 闂備礁鎲¢悷锕傛偤閺囥垹鐒垫い鎺嗗亾闁哥喐鎸抽妴鍌炴嚍閵夛箑鍔呴梺璺ㄥ櫐閹凤拷 | 
婵犵數鍋涢ˇ鏉棵洪弽顐n偨闁靛鏅涢悙濠囨煕濞嗗秴鍔氬┑顕嗘嫹 | 闂佽崵濮村ú銈壦囬幎绛嬫晩闁规崘顕х粻浼存煕閵夋垵鍟伴、锟� | 闂佹眹鍩勯崹浼村箺濠婂牆鏋侀柕鍫濇噳閺嬫牠鏌¢崶锝嗩潑婵炵》鎷� | 婵犵數鍋涢ˇ鏉棵洪弽顐n偨闁靛/鈧崑鎾诲捶椤撶偘绮舵繝娈垮櫙閹凤拷 | 婵犵數鍋涢ˇ鏉棵洪弽顐n偨闁靛鏅滈悡鍌氣攽閻樿精鍏岄柣銈忔嫹 | 婵犵數鍋涢ˇ鏉棵洪弽顐n偨闁靛鏅滈埛鎺撱亜閺傚灝鈷旈柟鏂ゆ嫹 | 婵犵數鍋涢ˇ鏉棵哄┑瀣剁稏濠㈣泛鏈崰鍡涙煥濠靛棛澧遍柛銈忔嫹 | 闂佽崵鍠嶅鎺旂矆娓氣偓瀹曡绂掔€n亝顥濋梺鎼炲劵缁犳垶鎱ㄩ敓锟� | 闂佽姘﹂鏍ㄧ濠靛牊鍏滈柛鎾茶兌鐏忕敻鏌ㄩ悤鍌涘 | 婵犳鍠楄摫闁搞劎鏁诲鏌ュ閻橆偅鐏冮梺鍝勬川婵箖锝為敓锟� | 闂佽崵鍋炵粙鎴﹀嫉椤掑嫬妫橀柛灞惧焹閺嬫牠鏌¢崶鈺佇い顐嫹 | 缂傚倸鍊风粈浣烘崲閹寸姷鐭堥柣鐔稿閺嬫牠鏌¢崶鈺佇い顐嫹 | 闂備礁鎲$敮妤呭垂閸撲焦鍏滈柛鎾茶兌鐏忕敻鏌ㄩ悤鍌涘 | 缂傚倷璁查崑鎾绘煕濞嗗秴鍔ょ紒鎰殕缁绘稒寰勭€n偆顦柣鐐寸啲閹凤拷 | 婵犵鍓濋〃鍛存偋閸涱垱顐介柕澹嫭鍎遍柣搴秵娴滄粓鍩i敓锟� | 闂備線娼уΛ宀勫磻閹剧粯鐓忛柛鈥崇箰娴滈箖姊洪棃娑欘棏闁稿鎹囬弻鏇㈠幢韫囨挷澹�
A Review of the Provisions Supplied By recently Amended PRC Company Law to Protect Shareholders’ Interests

     It can be easily defeated by reducing the size of the board of directors or supervisors.
 B. A Right to Convene a Temporary Meeting and Deliver Drafts
 The substantive rights ultimately rely upon the optimization of relating in-company procedural rules and mechanisms. The recently amended CCL provides that any shareholder who owns or any shareholders who jointly own more than 10 percent of all stocks has (have) the right to suggest convening a temporary shareholders’ meeting.
     It is very common that the majority shareholders monopolize the right to propose items for the agenda of a shareholders’ meeting. Thereby, our legislators consider it necessary to pay attention to issues concerned by minority shareholders: one shareholder or shareholders can bring forward temporary drafts and deliver them to the board of directors 10 days before the shareholders’ meeting, provided that he owns or they jointly own more than 3 percent of all stocks.
     Majority shareholders are no longer overwhelmingly preponderant on the holders’ meeting.
 However, differing from the recently amended CCL, many countries’ company laws also provide that shareholders
     have the right to convene the holders’ meeting directly after acquiring a warrant from the court if the board of directors disregards their suggestion. Apparently, minority shareholders in our country lack the remedy supplied by a court within its jurisdiction. No remedy, no right, after all. Moreover, there is no any modification on the mechanism of designating proxies.
     Minority shareholders can assemble sufficient voting rights to check majority shareholders if this mechanism functions smoothly. The recently amended CCL should have specified the qualifications and quantity of proxies, the recruitment of trust deed etc.
 C. Restrictions of Majority Shareholders’ Voting Rights
 The recently amended CCL supplements several provisions about procedural obligations of majority shareholders, which can availably regulate abusive rights to control the company. Majority shareholders commonly command the board of directors to authorize unfair related-party transactions. These transactions are determined by one party in fact.
     But the restrictions on directors’ voting rights can triumphantly exclude listed company’s directors who are affiliated to the corporation which is related with the proceedings to be resolved by the board meeting.
     The status quo that listed companies are vulnerable to expropriation by controlling shareholders can be substantially restrained by this mechanism.
     Minority shareholders may have a promising blueprint on the securities market and gradually forget “the sigh of century”.
    
 Minority shareholders always suffer for the corporation’s decisions impelled by majority shareholders. Hereby, the recently amended CCL adopts the mechanism of abstention of interested shareholders’ voting rights. The resolution on providing shareholders or factual controlling owners who can not participate in voting with guaranties must be passed by all disinterested shareholders.
     It is a reasonable modification of the principle of free voting, which represents the development of shareholders’ democracy in company law.
     So minority shareholders can prevent majority shareholders manipulating company resolutions on related-party transactions.
     But maybe there is a fly in the ointment: this comparatively practical mechanism can but be carried out on providing guaranties for the affiliated shareholders or controllers. It seems that minority shareholders are still in a devil of hole.


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