Among those, however, market share is the most significant benchmark, according to which dominance may be presumed or denied in terms of Article 15. Enough large market share leads to presumption of dominance, whereas enough little market share automatically results into non-dominance. Herein we should take note of whether this presumption is arguable. If so, how can the opposite party defend itself?
　
　d. Unexhausted examples:
　Seven examples are listed from Article 16 to Article 22. I guess the draft does not provide all the examples unexhaustedly.
　1. Monopolistic High Prices (Exploitative Price)
　2. Predatory Pricing (Monopolistic Low Prices)
　3. Dissimilar Treatment (Discrimination)
　4. Refusal to Deal
　5. Exclusive Transactions, Forced Transactions (seems that this activity shall fall into the scope of “Monopoly Agreements”)
　6. Tie-in
　7. Refusal of Access to Network (a special case of “Refusal to Deal”)
　
　e. penalty
　1. Cease and desist such act
　2. Impose fines between RMB 100,000 to RMB 10,000,000 or not exceeding 10% of the turnover in the relevant market in the preceding year
　
　C. Control of concentration
　
　a. Definition of concentration:
　The sector concerns the anti-competitive effect produced by Merger or Acquisition. Here a special term is used, a concentration, which shall be deemed to arise in the following situations:
　(1) Merger of one or more undertakings into one existing or new enterprise;
　(2) Acquisition of 20% or more voting shares or substantial assets of one or more other undertakings;
　(3) Acquisition of control through entrusted operation or joint venture;
　(4) Acquisition of direct or indirect control on the business operation or personnel matters of one or more other undertakings;
　(5) Acquisition of control of one or more other undertakings by contract or technology transfer.

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