见Hart & Wechsler, op. cit. supra note 7, at 14-16; Hart, Book Review, Professor Crosskey and Judicial Review, 67 Harvard Law Review 1456 (1954).
Hand, op. cit. supra note 3, at 15.
见Freund, On Understanding the Supreme Court 64-65 (1949); Freund, Mr. Justice Brandeis: A Centennial Memoir, 70 Harvard Law Review 769, 787-788 (1957)。并参见Bickel, The Unpublished Opinions of Mr. Justice Brandeis 1-20 (1957).
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 154.
如果还记得的话，杰弗逊之所以反对颁发针对国务卿的强制令，是基于
宪法有关司法权和行政权分离的论点。见1 Warren, The Supreme Court in the United States History 232 (1937); Kendall v. United States, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 610 (1838); Lee, The Origins of Judicial Control of Federal executive Action, 36 Georgia Law Journal 287 (1948).
例如见Developments in the Law – Remedies Against the United States and Its Officials, 70 Harvard Law Review 827 (1957).
导致这种成长的决定并不总是直接面对背后的问题，例如见Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579 (1958)，并比较J. Prettyman在下级法院的意见，243 F.2d 613 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
Hand, op. cit. supra note 3, at 15.
Frankfurter, John Marshall and the Judicial Function, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 217, 227-228 (1955), in Government Under Law 6, 19 (Sutherland ed. 1956).
见Kennedy, Profiles in Courage 126 (1956)。（Andrew Johnson，林肯被刺后由副总统继任总统，后在重建政策上和国会发生分歧而遭到弹劾，最终因一票之差而保住总统职位。——译者注。）
合众国宪法第一条第五款规定：“各议院应是其自己成员的选举、结果统计和资格的裁判者。……各院可决定其程序规则，针对违反秩序的行为而惩罚其成员，并在2/3多数成员赞同的情况下开除一成员。”曾有人将初选中发生的不正常情况作为拒绝联邦参议员入席的理由，关于针对这种理由的充分性提出的
宪法挑战，见Beck, May It Please the Court 265 (1930).
