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See Andrea Guaccero, Recent Developments in European Takeover and Corporate Law, Cardozo Journal of International and Comparative Law, Vol. 12, P91+.
See Robert C. Clark, Corporate Law, Aspen Law & Economics, 1986, P602—603. See also Robert A. G. Monks and Nell Minow, Corporate Governance, Second Edition, Blackwell Publishing Inc., 2000, P41+. See also Franklin A. Gevurtz, Corporation Law, West Group, 2000, Pp304—305.
See also Franklin A. Gevurtz, Corporation Law, ibid, P221.
这也是特许主义理论的产物。See also Franklin A. Gevurtz, Corporation Law, ibid, P220.
对此的讨论非常之多，例如 see Lucian Arye Bebchuk and Martin Lipton, The Case Against Board Veto in Corporate Takeover, University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 69, 2002, P973+. 该文指出不应当允许董事会阻挡超越必要期限的给予了股东以合理选择的要约收购，这是财产论的典型观点。而强调控制权的，则属于实体论。See also Wayne O. Hanewicz, When Silence is Golden: Why the Business Judgment Rule Should Apply to No-Shops in Stock—for—stock Merger Agreements, Journal of Corporation Law, Vol. 28, Issue 2, P205+. 有学者也从历史考察中得出了大公司的控制权被实际控制在管理者手中的结论，例如 See David Bunting and Mark S. Mizruchi, The Transfer of Control of Large Corporations: 1905—19119, Journal of Economic Issues, Vol. 16, 1982, P985+. 实体论的学者常常关注于控制权的溢价和私自出售问题。例如 See Yededia Z. Stern, The Private Sale of Corporate Control: A Myth Dethroned, The Journal of Corporation Law, Vol. 25, 2000, Pp512—552. 其他的讨论，例如 See also Brain R. Cheffins, Mergers and the Evolution of Patterns of Corporate Ownership and Control: the British Experience, University of Cambridge Working Paper, 2003. Lynn A. Stout, Do Antitakeover Defenses Decrease Shareholder Wealth? The Ex Post/Ex Ante Valuation Problem, UCLA School of Law Working Paper, 2002. See also Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Efficient and Inefficient Sales of Corporate Control, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 109, Issue 4, 1994, Pp957—993.
See Robert A. G. Monks and Nell Minow, Corporate Governance, Second Edition, Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 2000, Pp92—93.
See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Conception that the Corporation is a Nexus of Contracts, and the Dual Nature of the Firm, The Journal of Corporation Law, Vol. 24, 1999, Pp819—836.
See Oliver E. Williamson, Visible and Invisible Governance, The American Economic Review, Vol. 84, Issue 2, 1994, Pp323—326.
See Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law, Harvard University Press, 1991, P1+.
See Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, fifth edition, Aspen Law & Business, 1998, P431.
See Larry D. Soderquist, Theory of the Firm: What a Corporation is, The Journal of Corporation Law, Vol. 25, Issue 2, 2000, P375—381.
也有学者将对企业和公司的认识总结为结构情形理论和组织生态学理论。See Jeffrey Pfeffer, New Directions for Organization Theory: Problems and Prospects, Oxford University Press, 1997, P156+.
See Oliver E. Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relational Contracting, Free Press, 1985, P10.
这涉及到另外一个命题，即现代合同理论的问题。See Ian R. Macneil and Paul J. Gudel, Contracts: Exchange, Transactions and Relations, Cases and Materials, Third Edition, Foundation Press, 2001, P25+; See also Oliver E. Williamson, The Firm as a Nexus of Treaties: An Introduction, in M. Aoki, B. Gustafsson and O. E. Williamson, eds., The Firm as a Nexus of Treaties, Sage Press, 1990, p11.同时，合同、财产和意志自由之间的关系，See James Gordley, Contract, Property, and the Will - the Civil Law and Common Law Tradition, in Scheiber, Harry N, The State and Freedom of Contract, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998. 阿蒂亚则通过对传统合同的批评，指出了现代合同的广泛性，See P. S. Atiyah, Contracts, Promises and the Law of Obligation, Law Quarterly Review, 1978; reprinted in P. S. Atiyah, Essays on Contract, Clarendon Press, 1986, Pp10—56.
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