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See Margaret M. Blair and Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, Virginia Law Review, Vol. 85, 1999, P247+. See also Margaret M. Blair and Lynn A. Stout, Director Accountability and the Mediating Role of the Corporate Board, Washington University Law Quarterly, Vol. 79, 2001, Pp403—447.其他的代表性作品，也非常之多。例如 R. Daniels, Stakeholders and Takeovers: Can Contractarianism be Compassionate? University of Toronto Law Journal, Vol. 43, 1993, Pp315—351.
See Brian R. Cheffins, Corporations, in Peter Cane and Mark Tushnet, eds., Oxford Handbook of Legal Studies, Oxford University Press, 2003, Pp485—509.
See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director’s Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, Northwestern University Law Review, Vol. 97, Issue 2, 2003, P547+.
See Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, Economica, Vol. 4, 1937, P386+, Pp387—388.
较新的理论，See Raghuram G. Rajan and Luigi Zingales, Power in the theory of the Firm, University of Chicago Working Paper, 2000. 两位学者不是从产权而是从对核心资产的“用益权”的角度来解释企业内的权力形成的。
对法律和经济学中使用的“产权”的概念不同的分析，See Thomas W. Merrill and Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and Economics? The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 111, 2001, Pp357—398.事实上，经济学中所使用的“产权”，并不一定能够得到法律的确认和执行，而忽略了法律本身的成本和技术限制。因此，产权一词，在很大程度上，是等同于权利的，而且并不限于法律上的权利，并不是什么权利束的概念。
Walter Lippmann, Drift and Mastery: An Attempt to Diagnose the Current Unrest, Prentice Hall, Reprint in 1961, Pp42—43.
Adolf A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property, Op. Cit, P122.
See David Millon, Communitarians, Contractarians, and the Crisis in Corporate Law, Washington and Lee Law Review, Vol. 50, Issue 4, 1993, P1373+.
这是这一问题的争论核心，对此的探讨非常之多，并且仍然在继续之中，例如 See Lynn A. Stout, The Shareholder as Ulysses: Some Empirical Evidence on Why Investors in Public Corporations Tolerate Board Governance, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 152, 2003, Pp667—712. 较为综述性的论述，例如 See also Ronald M. Green, Shareholders as Stakeholders Changing Metaphors of Corporate Governance, Washington & Lee Law Review, Vol. 50, 1993, P1409+. 理论化的总结，例如 Lawrence E. Mitchell, Groundwork of the metaphysics of corporate law, Washington and Lee Law Review, Vol. 50, Issue 4, 1993, P1477+.
有关争论的延伸，以及与stakeholder和stockholder之间的关系，参见 Thomas A. Smith, The Efficient Norm for Corporate Law: A Neotraditional Interpretation of Fiduciary Duty, Michigan Law Review, Vol. 98, Issue 1, 1999, Pp214—268.
See Willston, History of the Law of Business Corporations Before 1800, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 2, 1888, P105+.
参见 王利明：《民商合一与我国民商法的关系》，《西北政法学院学报》1986年第1期；参见 邓峰：《试论民法的商法化及其与经济法的关系―对民法、经济法社会本位的比较思考》，《法学家》1997年第3期。
See George P. Baker and George David Smith, The New Financial Capitalists: Kohlberg Kravis Roberts and the Creation of Corporate Value, Cambridge University Press, 1999.
See Henry R. Cheeseman, The Legal and Regulatory Environment, Second Edition, Prentice—Hall, Inc., 2000, Pp34—36.
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