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19.未来的研究
尽管有关公共执法已积累了大量研究，我们感到还有一些值得进一步发展的研究线索，最后我们在此对其中一些予以评论。
(a)本文未考察执法机构的行为及薪酬(compensation)，但这一课题相当重要并基于两项原因而应研究。第一，执法机构发现违法的动机受其支付结构的影响(特别是，他们是否因发现更多违法而获奖赏)。第二，执法机构可能腐败：他们可能收受贿赂，或以不报告违法为交换而要求支付。腐败倾向于削弱威慑力，并因此其存在明显将影响最优执法理论。
(b)我们也未探讨在疏导个人行为方面作为执法一般替代物的社会规范。社会规范，我们意指一套行为规则(例如，人们不应乱扔垃圾或不应种族歧视)，若违反可能产生以下后果：违反者可能经受内部制裁(内疚、自责)；其他人可能对违反者实施外部的、法律外社会制裁(流言，排斥)；以及其他人可能因惩罚违反者而体验效用或负效用。关于社会规范已出现一些文献，看来值得进一步研究，因为社会规范对行为具有的影响，因为它们作为正式法律替代和补充的角色，还因为法律本身影响社会规范的可能性。
(c)以上并未考虑私人预防犯罪的行动(如上锁、持有武器、雇佣私人警察)，但显然这非常重要，需与公共执法理论整合为一体。值得注意的是，私人减少犯罪的努力至少在某种程度上可作为公共部门努力的替代物；而且，有时私人努力比公共部门的努力更有效(居民可能更清楚在哪儿上锁)，但有时效率更低(公共机关更清楚如何召集警察)。有必要考察为减少犯罪私人与公共努力的良性协调。
(d)为更好测算制裁的威慑效应，迫切需要对执法进行经验研究，特别是把制裁量度的影响与其适用的概率区分开来。此外，当制裁为监禁时，威慑效应需与剥夺能力的效应区分。研究为减少犯罪而作为执法替代的公共政策，如职业培训项目及相关社会投资，也有一定的重要性。
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