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The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, ed. Wilfrid E. Rumble, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995, p. 29.
同前，p. 24.
The Elements of Jurisprudence, 13th ed., Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924, p. 42.
The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, p. 24.
The Concept of Law, p. 80.
The Concept of Law, p. 26.
The Concept of Law, p. 29.
The Concept of Law, pp. 27, 48.
The Concept of Law, p. 28.
The Concept of Law, p. 42.
The Concept of Law, pp. 48, 77.
Jurisprudence, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978, p. 274.
An Institutional Theory of Law, Dordrecht(Holland): D, Reidel Publishing Company, 1986, p.47, n. 9.（该书共同作者是英国学者Neil MacCormick──笔者注）
The Idea of Law, New York: Viking Penguin Inc., 1981, p. 37.
Of Laws in General, p. 58; The Province of Law Determined, p. 34.
《法律的概念》说：“要理解授予授予个人权利的规则，就必须从行使它们的那些人的观点去看待它们。”（The Concept of Law, p. 40.）
T. Benditt, Law as Rule and Principle, California: Stanford University Press, 1978, p. 66.
J. P. Gibbs, “Definitions of Law and Empirical Questions, ” Law and Society (1968), p. 440.
The Concept of Law, p. 55.
The Concept of Law, p. 55
The Concept of Law, p. 83.
《法律的概念》有时提到：“……法律制度的存在是一个时常表现两个现象的社会存在，如果希望对之有一个现实的观点，就必须对这两个现象都有所关注。它包含自愿接受规则的态度和行为，也包含仅仅服从或默认的比较简单的态度和行为。”（The Concept of Law, p. 197.）但是， 其主要论说强调了积极的内在观点对法律存在的必要的条件地位。
The Idea of a Social Science, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1958. 另见The Concept of Law, p. 242.
The Idea of a Social Science, pp. 52, 133.
The Idea of a Social Science, p. 115.
H. L. A. Hart, California: Stanford University Press, 1981.
The Authority of Law, pp. 154, 156; H. L. A. Hart, pp. 34-43.
Law as rule and Principle, pp. 82, 83.
The Concept of Law, p. 113.
The Concept of Law, p. 198.
The Concept of Law, p. 114.
参见R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, London: Duckworty, 1978, p. 52.
《法律的概念》说：“坚持习惯地服从以威吓为后盾的命令是法律制度的基础的学说，其优点正是在于迫使我们以现实主义的方式思考我们称之为一个法律制度的存在的复杂现象的相对消极方面，其缺点在于模糊或歪曲了主要（尽管不是全部）在法律制度的官员或专家制定、确定和适用法律的运作中见到的其他相对积极方面。如果打算明白这个复杂社会现象实际上是怎样的，就必须记住这两个方面。”（The Concept of Law, p. 60.）
The Concept of Law, p. 78-79.
The Concept of Law, p. 48.
The Concept of Law, p. 92.
The Concept of Law, p. 107.
The Concept of Law, p. 96. “内在观点”就是行为者对行为模式的积极态度，即“规则的内在方面”。
分析法学的文本有时提到过“认可”这个概念。比如《确定法理学范围》第VI章说：新的主权者可以明示认可或默许认可旧的主权者制定的法律。但是，“认可”概念仍是不能说明使新的主权者正常取得权力能够合法的法律的存在。
比如The Authority of Law, pp. 90-98; Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory, p. 233; J. Raz, “Legal Principle and Limits of Law, ” 81 Yale Law Journal (1972); P. Soper, “Legal Theory and the Obligation of a Judge: Hart/Dworkin Dispute,” 75 Michigan Law Review (1977); R. Sartorius, “Social Policy and Judicial Legislation,” 8 Am Phil Q (1971).
The Concept of Law, p. 59.
The Concept of Law, p. 114.
主要指价值倾向的自然法理论的作品。
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