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在当今英国的司法实践中，各级法院在表述刑事诉讼证明标准时，除使用排除合理怀疑外，还广泛使用另外一种表述方法：“被说服从而确信(satisfied so that they feel sure)”(简言之为“确信有罪”，即“sureof guilty”)。“被说服从而确信”与“排除合理怀疑”在英国都被认为是刑事证明标准的合法表述。“被说服从而确信”的表述方法是英国著名巡回法官戈达德勋爵在1950年的克里斯案件中首先倡导使用的。在1952年的萨默斯案件中，戈达德勋爵进一步阐述了自己的主张。他说：“陪审团应被告知，他们的职责是审查证据，并在证据说服了他们从而使他们确信时作出有罪判决。这一表述方法比使用排除合理怀疑更好。我希望将来这一表述方法得到认同。”其后，这一案件被获准上诉到英国枢密院，枢密院在判决中认可了戈达德勋爵的表述方法。在1969年的沃尔特斯案件中，枢密院再次肯定了戈达德勋爵的表述方法。近年来，英国法官在表示刑事诉讼证明标准时又广泛使用一种新的表述方式，即将“排除合理怀疑”与“被说服从而确信”结合起来，具体表述是：“案件必须被证明到排除合理怀疑，即在定罪前被说服从而确信的程度”。这一表述方式是斯卡门勋爵在1979年的弗格森案件中首次提出的。
然而“被说服从而相信”仍然是一个很抽象的标准。何种情况下才会被说服?何种情况下才能使其相信?不同的人要求的证明程度可能是不一样的。正如一位英国学者所言：有些法官和陪审员可能很容易被说服，而有些法官和陪审员很难被说服。因而英美法系对刑事证明标准制度的改革与完善也将任重而道远。
【注释】
State v. Wilson, N.J.L. 502,506(1793).
Bond’s Case, 27 How. St. Tr. 523(Ir. 1798);Finney’s Case, 26 How.St. Tr. 1019(Ir. 1798).
Anthony A. Morano, A Reexamination of the Development of theReasoable Doubt Rule, B. U. L. Rew. Vol. 55, 1975, p. 507-508.
③，P.516-518.
Woolmington v. Director of Public Prosecutions(1935)A. C. 462.
Stanley Aschiff, Evidence in the Litigation Process(2d ed) ,theCarwell Company Limited, 1983,p. 1123;
同②,p.1120-1124, Cross, Cross on Evidence (Third Australian Edition), Butterworths,1986, 243-249; Andrew Bruce &Gerard Mccoy, Criminal Evidence in Hong Kong,Butterworths, 1987, p. 46-52.
The Harvard Law Review Association, Reasonable Doubt: An ArgumentAgainst Definition, Harv. L. Rev. Vol. 108, 1995, p. 1955-1972.
Henty A. Diamond, Reasonable Doubt: to Define, or not to Define,Colum. L. Rev. Vol. 90, 1990, p. 1719.
Jessica N. Cohen, the Reasonable Doubt Jury Instruction: GivingMeaning to a Critical Concept, Am J. Crim. L. Vol. 22, 1995, p.682.h
United States v. Lawson, 507 F. 2d 433(1974),cert. denied,420 U.S.1004 (1975).
Jessica N. Cohen, the Reasonable Doubt Jury Instruction: GivingMeaning to a Critical Concept, Am. J. Crim. L. Vol. 22, 1995,p.684.
Dun v. Perrin, 570 F. 2d 21,23(1st Cir 1978), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 910(1978).
United States v. Adkins, 937 F. 2d 947, 950(4th Cir. 1991).
United States v. Reives, 15F. 3d 42,45-46(4th Cir. 1994).
en banc 又称sitting en banc，指由法院的所有法官司出庭审理作出判决，通常简称满席听审。在美国，联邦最高法院和各州终审法院都以满席听审的方式开庭审理；在上诉法院，满席听审通常只适用于具有极大争议或涉及公共利益的案件，以及本院中一个或多个合议庭在主要法律观点上存有分歧的案件。参见彼得·G·伦斯特洛姆：《美国法律词典》，贺卫方等译，中国政法大学出版社1998年版，第289页。
Devitt & Blackmar, Federal Jury Practice and Instructions (4th ed.)West Publishing Co. 1987, p. 354.
同②，p. 686-687.
同②, p. 687-688.
William Bojczuk & D.J.Cracknell(revised and updated), EvidenceTextbook, HLT Publications, 1995,p.82.
Adrian Keane, the Modern Law of Evidence, Butterworths, 1996.p.85.
M. I. Aronson, N. S. Reaburn, M.S.Weinberg, Litigation:Evidence and Procedure(3rd ed.),Butterworths, 1982,p. 487.
同①。
Jessica N. Cohen, the Reasonable Doubt Jury Instruction: GivingMeaning to a Critical Concept, Am. J. Crim. L. Vol. 22,1995,p.694.
Henry A Diamond, Reasonable Doubt: to Define, or not to Define,Cloum. L. Rev. Vol. 90, 1990,p.1717.
Rupert Cross & Nancy Wilkins, An Outline of the Law ofEvidence, Butterworths, 1980,p. 36.
Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39, 40(1990).
Jon O. Newman, Beyond”Reasonble Doubt”, N.Y.U.L.Rev.Vol.68,1993,p.982.
Holland v. United States, 348 U. S. 121(1954).
Jessica N. Cohen, the Reasonable Doubt Jury Instruction: GivingMeaning to a Critical Concept, Am. J. Crim. L. Vol. 22, 1995, p. 679-680.
同③，p. 687.
Richard May, Criminal Evidence, Sweet & Maxwell, 1986, p.58;Adrian Keane, the Modern Law of Evidence, Betterworths, 1996, p. 87.
R. v. Gray(1973), 58 Cr. App. Rep. 177.
Adrian Keane, the Modern Law of Evidence, Betterworths, 1996,p. 87.
Richard May, Criminal Evidence, Sweet & Maxwell, 1986, p. 58.
United States v. Colonpagan, F. 3d 80, 81(1st Cir.1993).
Jon O. Newman, Beyond”Reasonable Doubt”, N. Y. U. L. Rev. Vol. 68,1993. p. 984.
Jessica N. Cohen, the Reasonable Doubt Jury Instruction: GivingMeaning to a Critical Concept, Am. J. Crim. L. Vol. 22, 1995, p. 686.
同②,p. 694.
Peter Murphy, Criminal Practice, Blackstone Press Limited, 1997,p.1846.
李学灯：《证据法比较研究》，台湾五南图书出版有限公司1992年版，第666-667页。
同②,p.681.
Anthony A. Morano, A Reexamination of the Development of theReasonable Doubt Rule, B. U. L. Rev. Vol. 55, 1975, p. 513-514.
Peter Gillies, Law of Evidence in Australia(2d ed.), Legal Books,1987, p. 70.
同⑥。
The Harvard Law Review Association, Reasonable Doubt: An ArgumentAgainst Definition, Harv. L. Rev. Vol. 108,1995,p.1972.
Jessica N. Cohen, the Reasonable Doubt Jury Instruction: GivingMeaning to a Critical Concept, Am. J. Crim. L. Vol. 22, 1995, p. 682.
United States v. Fatico, 458 F. Supp. 388, 406(E. D. N. Y. 1978)，Affd. 603, F. 2d, 1053(2d Cir.1979), cert. Denied, 444, U. S. 1073(1980).
乔恩·R·华尔兹：《刑事证据大全》，何家弘译，中国人民大学出版社1993年版，第313页。
Peter Murphy, Murphy on Evidence, Blackstone Press Limited, 1997,p. 110.
Federal Judicial Center, Pattem Criminal Jury Instruction,Instruction 21,1987.
同②，p.687.
Devitt & Blackmar, Federal Jury Practice and Instructions(4thed.), West Publishing Co. 1987, p. 354.
艾伦·德肖维奇；《合理的怀疑：从辛普森案批判美国司法体制》，高忠义、侯荷婷译，台湾商周出版公司2001年版，第107-108页。
Geoffrey P. Kramer & Doorean M. Koenig Do Jurors UnderstandCriminal Jury Instruction? Analysing the Result of the Michigan JurorComprehension Project, U Mich. J. L. Vol. 23, 1990, p. 414.
Strwan & Buchanan, Jury Confusion: A Threat to Justice,Judicature, Vo. 59, 1976, p. 480-481.
Kerr, Atkin, Stasser, Meek, Holt & Davis, Guilty Beyond aReasonable Doubt: Effects of Concept Definition and Assigned Decision Rule onthe Judgements of Mock Jurors, J. Personality & Soc Psychology, Vol. 34,1976, p.282-292.
绝大多数的美国民众——尤其是美国白人都深信辛普森杀害了布朗与高德曼。除此以外，他们也想念任何一个理性的陪审团都不会作出与此不同的认定。根据《华盛顿邮报》在判决之后的几天内进行的民意调查，发现有70%的美国白人认为辛普森有罪，60%的民众认为陪审团的判决是出于偏见，有失公允。就全国民众来说，有60%的人认为辛普森有罪，56%的民众‘不赞同’判决结果，还有51%的民众认为联审团偏袒辛普森。参见]艾伦·德肖维奇：《合理的怀疑：从辛普森案批判美国司法体制》，高忠义、侯荷婷译，台湾商周出版公司2001年版，第104页。
Jessica N. Cohen, the Reasonable Doubt Jury Instruction: GivingMeaning to a Critical Concept, Am. J. Crim. L. Vol. 22, 1995, p. 690-691.
United States v. Noone, 913 F, 2d 20, 28-29(1st Cir. 1990),cert.Denied, 111 S. Ct. 1686(1991).
Adrian Keane, the Modern Law of Evidence, Butterworths, 1996, p.86.
Jon O. Newman, Beyond “Reasonable Doubt”, N.Y.U.L.Rev. Vol.68,1993,p.983-984.
United States v. Porter, 821, F. 2d,968, 973(4th Cir. 1987), cert.Denied, 485, U.S.,934(1988).
The Harvard Law Review Association, Reasonable Doubt: An ArgumentAgainst Definition, Harv. L. Rev. Vol. 108, 1995, p. 1969.
Jon O. Newman, Beyond “Reasonable Doubt”, N.Y.U.L.Rev. Vol. 68,1993, p. 986-989.
The Harvard Law Review Association, Reasonable Doubt: An ArgumentAgainst Definition, Harv. L. Rev. Vol. 108,1995,p. 1969.
Jon O. Newman, Beyond “Reasonable Doubt”, N.Y.U.L.Rev. Vol. 68,1993, p. 983-984.
同②，p.986-989.
Peter Murphy, Murphy on Evidence, Blackstone Press Limited,1997,p.111.
Walters(1969),2A. C. 26, p.30.
R. v. Summers(1952),36, Cr. App. R. 14.
D. W. Elliott, Elloitt and Phipson: Manual of the Law of Evidence,1980,p. 72.
Peter Murphy, Criminal Practice, Blackstone Press Limited, 1997, p.1845.
Peter Gillies, Law of Evidence in Australia(2d ed. ), Legal Books,1987, p. 70
Peter Murphy, Murphy on Evidence, Blackstone Press Limited, 1997,p. 110-111.
R. v. Kritz(1950),1 K. B. 82, C. C. A. p. 89-90.
⑤，p. 111.
Adrian Keane, the Modem Law of Evidence, Butterworths, 1990.p. 87.
同⑧。
William Bojczuk & D. J. Cracknell(revised and updated),Evidence Textbook, HLT Publications, 1995,p.82.
erguson V. R. (1979),1 W.L.R.94.
同⑩,P.81.
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