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法治的可能性及其限度——一个“公共选择理论”的分析模型

  
  
【注释】  【1】 Frank H. Knight, An Unpublished Lecture. 见The New Palgrave: An Dictionary of Economics ( edited by John Eatwell, Murry Milgate & Peter Newman, The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1987)第三卷中George J. Stigler 撰写的词条:“Frank Hyneman Knight”, pp.58-59。


【2】 张申府,《所思》,三联书店1986年版,第4页。


【3】 (美)汉密尔顿、杰伊、麦迪逊著,《联邦党人文集》,程逢如、在汉、舒逊译,商务印书馆1980年版,第264页。


【4】 Mikva(1988), A., Forward to Symposium on the Theory of Public Choice, 74 Virginia Law Review 167。


【5】 Tullock, Gordon. (1991), “Duncan Black: the Founding Father”, Public Choice, 71, 125-128.


【6】 Mueller (1985), Dennis C., ‘The “Virginia School”and Public Choice’, in The Public Approach to Politics, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., 1993.


【7】〖美〗丹尼斯·缪勒,《公共选择》,王诚译,北京:商务印书馆1992年版。p.5。


【8】 以上评价均见于:Nobel Foundation comp., Nobel Lectures in Economic Sciences, 1981-1990, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., Singapore, 1992.


【9】 Buchanan, J. M. & Tullock, G (1962), The Calculus of Consent, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. p.96.


【10】 参见:McKenzie, R. (ed) (1984), Constitutional Economics. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.


【11】 参见:〖奥〗哈耶克,“个人主义:真与伪”,《个人主义与经济秩序》,贾湛、文跃然等译,北京经济学院出版社1991年版,pp.1-31。


【12】 Buchanan, Marginal Notes on Reading Political PhilosophyBuchanan & Tullock (1962), The Calculus of Consent, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. p.315.


【13】 Buchanan (1990), “The Domain of Constitutional Economics”, Constitutional Political Economy, 1(1),p.14.


【14】 Thomas Paine (1776), “Common Sense”, In B. Kuklick ed., Political Writings, Cambridge University Press, 1989, P.2.


【15】 参见:Bentley, Arthur. 1908. The Process of Government. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; Latham, Earl. 1952. The Group Basis of Politics: A Study of Basing Point Legislation. Ithaca: Cornell University Press; Truman, David. 1952. The Governmental Process. New York: Knopf.


【16】 Mancur Olson (1984), Interview: ‘Why Nations Rise and Fall’, Challenge, March/April, p.15.


【17】 Mancur Olson (1982),The Rise and Decline of Nations, p.21, New Haven and London: Yale University Press.


【18】 参见:〖美〗曼瑟尔·奥尔森著,《集体行动的逻辑》,陈郁等译,上海三联书店·上海人民出版社1995年版。


【19】 参见:〖美〗肯尼斯·阿罗,《社会选择与个人价值》,陈志武、崔之元译,四川人民出版社1987年版。


【20】 Borda (1781), Memoire sur les elections au scrutin. Histoire de l’Academie Royale de Sciences. Paris.


【21】 Condorcet (1785), Essai sur l’application de l’analyse a la probabilite des decisions rendues a la pluralite des voix. Paris.


【22】 参见:Duncan Black (1948), “On the Rationale of Group Decision-Making”, Journal of Political Economy, LVI, 23-34。


【23】 参见:〖美〗肯尼斯·阿罗,《社会选择与个人价值》,陈志武、崔之元译,四川人民出版社1987年版。


【24】 参见:May, K. (1952), “A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision”, Economitrica 20(4), 680-84。


【25】 Shepsle, Kenneth A., & Weingast, Barry R. (1981), “Structure-Induced Equilibrium and Legislative Choice”,


【26】 Shepsle, Kenneth A. (1983), “Institutional Equilibrium and Equilibrium Institutions”, Working Paper No.82, St. Louis: Center for the Study of American Business, Washington University.


【27】 North, Douglass C. (1981), Structure and Change in Economic History, New York: W. W. Norton. p.20


【28】 Knut Wicksell (1896), “A New Principle of Just Taxation”, in Classics in the Theory of Public Finance, edited by R. A. Musgrave and A. T. Peacock, London: MacMillan, 1958. p.89.


【29】 参见:Tullock, Gordon (1967), “The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft”, Western Economic Journal, V, 224-232;Tullock (1971), ”The Cost of Transfers”, Kyklos, XXIV,629-642.


【30】 Krueger, Anne O. (1974), “The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society”, American Economic Review, LXIV (3), June, 291-303.


【31】 参见:Niskanen, William (1975), “Bureaucrats and Politicians”, Journal of Law and Economics, XVIII (3), December, 617-673.


【32】 Down, A. (1967), Inside Bureaucracy, Boston: Little, Brown. pp.24-25.


【33】 以上论述和引文:Downs, A. (1967), Inside Bureaucracy, (boston: Little, Brown).


【34】 Niskanen, W.A. (1971), Bureaucracy and Representative Government, Chicago: Aldine-Atherton.


【35】 参见:Dunleavy, Patrick (1991), Democracy, Bureaucracy and Public Choice, Hertfordshire: Harvester Wheatsheaf.


【36】 Stigler, George J. (1946), “The Economics of Minimum wage Legislation”, American Economic Review 36, no.3 (June 1946).


【37】 参见:〖美〗乔治·J·斯蒂格勒,《产业组织和政府管制》下篇,潘振民译,上海三联出版社1989年版。


【38】 Demsetz, Harold (1969), “Perfect Competition, Regulation, and the Stock Market”, in Demsetz, Efficiency, Competition, and Policy, Oxford and New York: Basil Blackwell, 1989.


【39】 参见:Rowley, Tollison and Tullock (1988), The Political Economy of Rent-Seeking. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers.


【40】 Buchanan, James M. (1981), “Constitutional Restrictions on the Power of Government”, in Buchanan and Tollison (ed.), The Theory of Public Choice-II, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1984. p.440.


【41】 Mueller, Dennis C. (1991), “Constitutional Rights”, in Mueller (1993), The Public Choice Approach to Politics, Edward Elgar. p.106.


【42】 Buchanan, James M. (1962), “Marginal Notes on Reading Political Philosophy”, in Buchanan and Tullock (1962), The Calculus of Consent, Ann Abor: The University of Michigan Press. pp308-322.


【43】 Buchanan, James M. (1975), “A Contractarian Paradigm for Applying Economic Theory”, American Economic Review, LXV(2), May, 229.


【44】〖英〗霍布斯(1651),《利维坦》,黎思复、黎廷弼译,北京:商务印书馆1985年版,p.131-132


【45】 参见:Spinoza, Benedict, A Treatise on Politics, trans. by William Maccall (london:Holyoake).


【46】 参见:Mitchell, William C. and Munger, Michael C. (1991), ‘Economic Models of Interest Groups: An Introductory Survey”, American Journal of Political Science, 35(2), May, 512-46.


【47】 Landes, William M. and Posner, Richard A. (1975), “The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective”, Journal of Law and Economics, XVIII(3), December, 875-901.


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