Secondly, “
　　　　he question of whether a measure is one in the direction of WTO conformity or, on the contrary, maintains the original violation or aggravates it, can, in our view, not determine whether a measure is one ‘taken to comply’. If this were so, one would be faced with an absurd situation: if the implementing Member introduces a ‘better’ measure -- in the direction of WTO conformity -- it would be subject to an expedited Article 21.5 procedure; if it introduces a ‘worse’ measure -- maintaining or aggravating the violation -- it would have a right to a completely new WTO procedure. Our interpretation of ‘measures taken to comply’ is further supported by the practical difficulty of making a distinction between ‘better’ and ‘worse’ measures.”5
　Thirdly, “
　　　　e do not consider that measures taken subsequently to the establishment of an Article 21.5 compliance panel should per force be excluded from its mandate. Even before an original panel such measures were found to fall within the panel''s mandate because, in that specific case, the new measures did not alter the substance - only the legal form -- of the original measure that was explicitly mentioned in the request. In compliance panels we are of the view that there may be different and, arguably, even more compelling reasons to examine measures introduced during the proceedings. As noted earlier, compliance is often an ongoing or continuous process and once it has been identified as such in the panel request, as it was in this case, any ‘measures taken to comply’ can be presumed to fall within the panel''s mandate, unless a genuine lack of notice can be pointed to. Especially under the first leg of Article 21.5 when it comes to disagreements on the existence of measures taken to comply, one can hardly expect that all such measures - when there is no clarity on their very existence - be explicitly mentioned up-front in the panel request.”6

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