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For example, it is possible to instruct a printing machine to print a signature by electronic signal sent over a network or via a modem. Similarly, it is now possible with standard personal computer equipment and readily available popular word processing software to compose, say, a letter on a computer screen, incorporate within it the author''s signature which has been scanned into the computer and is stored in electronic form, and to send the whole document including the signature by fax modem to a remote fax. The fax received at the remote station may well be the only hard copy of the document. It seems to me that such a document has been ''signed'' by the author.
Therefore, a simple signature by putting the name at the end of the document is probably accepted by courts, particularly where there is no dispute over the attribution and authenticity of the document. If the party only challenges that the simple signature can’t function as a handwriting signature while acknowledging the authenticity of the message, it is not likely to be accepted by judges.
Although under the common law the requirements for signatures are not very strict, the principle laid down by the Model Law Article 9 should be followed. The evidential weight of this simple signature should be assessed in terms of “reliability of the manner in which message was generated, stored or communicated” and of other standards. It is clear that digital signatures are more reliable than the simple signatures when parties have different opinions on the attribution and authenticity of the message or even signatures themselves. If one party denies it sent the claimed message and apart from the simple typed name there is no other evidence proving the message was sent by the party, the claim may not be defeated.
Generally speaking, New Zealand Law Commission agreed that simple typed signatures are allowed under the existing law while certain special situations should be considered. However, it didn’t make a difference between disputed and non-disputed signatures or /and contents of contracts as I mentioned above, but between a distinction among different contracts which have different value and different subjects.
Section 29 of the Interpretation Act 1999 will (from 1 November1999) enable electronic communications to constitute “writing”. Whether or not an electronic equivalent to a manual signature will be sufficient to comply with the requirements for a signature under section 2(2) of the Contracts Enforcement Act will ultimately turn upon whether a court assesses the reliability of the electronic signature to be sufficiently reliable for the purpose for which it is used, having regard to the nature of the transaction. In most cases, a simple email message, with a person’s name typed at the foot, would, in our view, be insufficient to constitute a “signature” for contracts relating to land and guarantees. However, a court might find the signature sufficient if, for instance, the amount involved is of low value or the transaction is not complex or the parties have completed contracts by electronic means.
In my view, if a simple email signature is legally effective it is not necessary to make any difference between contractual subjects. If both parties to a contract admit the terms and conditions of the contract and they admit they typed their name on the contract, it is not appropriate for the court to rule out the enforceability of the contract only because the typed signatures are too simple to be suitable for contracts relating to land and guarantees. “The essential requirement of signing is the affixing, either by writing with a pen or pencil or by otherwise impressing on the document one''s name or
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